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From the Editor
“ISIS is losing. ISIS is definitely losing, and that’s why they’re striking at more soft 
targets abroad.” That was the sort of left-handed reassurance coming from the 
media chatterati after the worst mass shooting in US history (and that’s saying a 
lot) over the weekend of 11–12 June at a gay bar in Orlando, Florida. Mid-massacre, 
the young gunman dedicated the bloodshed to ISIS, just before the final shootout 
that killed him. 
Is there a connection between ISIS and this killer? Does it mean something that 
the shooter’s parents are Afghan immigrants? Did ISIS orchestrate the mayhem? 
The question of whether this attack was another local act of violence by an “ordi-
nary” American psychopath or an act of anti-American terrorism by a violent 
lone-wolf jihadist—or maybe both—will likely remain open for some time to 
come. Indeed, the belated self-congratulation that ISIS issued may have been 
purely opportunistic, once the group’s leaders discovered their name had been 
mentioned.  
More attacks went down in Istanbul (29 June), Dhaka (1 and 7 July), and Baghdad 
(3 July) over the 10 days before I finished this letter. Here’s the dilemma: in 
modern liberal democracies—and everywhere else—how do we parse domestic 
terrorism? Can we really hope to separate the personal grievances of individuals 
from their susceptibility to the ethnic or political or religious grievances that so 
many terrorist and insurgent groups cultivate? If you can convince someone who 
is filled with frustration and a personal sense of impotence not only that his rage 
is justified, but also—most importantly—that his impulse to violent retaliation 
is justified, then you might have yourself a terrorist. 
For instance, this issue begins with an investigation by Major Eric East of the 
ways in which Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has used his personal background and 
education, the consolidation of territory and populations, and a professional 
bureaucracy to establish his own legitimacy as “caliph” and normalize the status 
of the Islamic State as a “caliphate.” Based on a theory of horizontal (popular) 
and vertical (institutional) legitimation, MAJ East describes the ways in which 
Baghdadi has carefully crafted his image to win and maintain support, and 
inspire his cadres to extraordinary violence.
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Next up is Captain Marius Kristiansen’s exploration of radicalization in Norway. While the number of Norwegians who 
have gone to Syria to fight alongside ISIS extremists remains small, the challenges confronting the Norwegian government 
are significant. CPT Kristiansen makes clear that rewriting Norway’s national guidelines on deradicalization and counter-
terrorism represents a vital first step.
Our next two articles take us to the Asia-Pacific region and focus on two kinds of domestic terrorism. The first essay is a 
reminiscence by Brigadier General (Ret.) Hiran Halangode about an episode in Sri Lanka’s long, bloody civil war between 
the separatist Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan Army. BG Halangode describes how, over the 
course of a week in mid-1990, several isolated, undermanned army encampments fought to repel waves of well-armed LTTE 
attackers who sought to annihilate them. The second essay is by Lieutenant Commander Gilbert Villareal, who examines 
the plight of the Philippines’ indigenous populations on the island of Mindanao. These mostly poor, isolated communities 
are forced to choose sides between a chronic violent neo-Maoist insurgency and the armed forces of a too-often unrespon-
sive government. 
For our final feature article, Michael Tierney describes the innovative way in which Canada has reorganized its counter-
terrorism community in the wake of a notorious intelligence failure. The goal of the reforms has been to find the right 
balance between honoring each agency’s mandates and enabling vital collaboration.
The CTAP interview brings back Brian Fishman to discuss the history, current status, and future prospects of ISIS. In con-
versation with Dr. Doug Borer, Fishman delves into the important questions of what makes ISIS different from al Qaeda 
and other predecessors, and what its enemies need to understand if we are to defeat it.
Finally, in the occasional column State of the Art, designer Ryan Stuart explores the artwork of Terminal Lance: The White 
Donkey, a graphic novel based in Afghanistan. She uses her professional art background to explore how the combination 
of drawing and text opens up layers of meaning that neither one can quite achieve on its own.
We have several publication announcements for you, so be sure to check those out. 
Follow Global ECCO on Facebook at https://www.facebook.com/GlobalECCO/. We welcome your feedback! Write 
to us at CTXEditor@GlobalECCO.org. You can also send your essays, artwork, and movie and book reviews for possible 
publication to CTXSubmit@GlobalECCO.org.
ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor, CTX 
CTXEditor@globalecco.org
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Da’esh, Legitimacy, and the Rise of  
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
MAJ Eric East,  
US Army
In early July 2015, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Da’esh 
(also known as ISIS), issued an important order to his chieftains regarding 
Da’esh’s grotesque prisoner execution videos.1 The explicit order quickly passed 
down throughout the organization’s lowest levels: fighters must no longer release 
any footage of violent and graphic executions.2 This order was issued less because 
of the crimes being committed in the videos and more to ensure that Da’esh was 
being considerate of all Muslims and their children, especially those who might 
find the videos disturbing. It followed on the heels of a new Da’esh video release 
that showed a child of about 10 years beheading a captured Syrian officer and an-
other child shooting a prisoner in the head at point-blank range.3 With so many 
radical insurgents under his command, it is a mystery to most Westerners how 
Baghdadi has managed to garner the respect of and establish such legitimacy as a 
leader among people who can behave so barbarically. 
Explaining al-Baghdadi’s Rise to Power 
The CIA reports that Baghdadi has approximately 32,000 fighters under his command, 
while Kurdish forces that are engaging Da’esh on the ground give even larger 
numbers.4 What are the key factors behind Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s meteoric rise 
to power and the establishment of his legitimacy as leader among his followers? 
Insurgent groups such as Da’esh are not exempt from addressing issues like le-
gitimacy of rule. To gain the attention of the international community and draw 
people to him, Baghdadi has focused on three interwoven strategies: Islamic 
legal precedence, territorial ownership, and the Ba’athist nexus.
First, Baghdadi uses his knowledge of Islamic legal precedence extensively to 
legitimize both his rule and the violence Da’esh commits against others. Through 
his reading of the Qur’an’s texts, he has validated his ascension as the leader of all 
Muslims.5 Even conservative sects of Islam that adhere to a stricter interpretation 
of the Qur’an, such as the Salafists, believe there is merit in some of Baghdadi’s 
rhetoric, although many have strong reservations about his timing and methods.6 
Second, Baghdadi’s legitimacy as caliph is closely tied to the importance of terri-
tory. Territorial control is a classic strategy of most traditional states or non-state 
armed groups for gaining and maintaining legitimacy. Baghdadi controls a large 
swath of land across Iraq and Syria, which allows him to do what he and his 
followers consider necessary to strengthen his legitimacy and Da’esh’s role within 
the proclaimed state. 
Finally, Baghdadi’s connection with former Saddam Hussein loyalists and 
Ba’ath Party loyalists is an equally vital aspect of his and Da’esh’s legitimacy. In 
2015, investigative reporter Christoph Reuter brought to light Da’esh docu-
ments indicating that former Ba’athists have been instrumental in establishing 
Baghdadi’s legitimacy.7 Reuter contends that the melding of these two groups 
resulted in one of the most tightly hierarchical and well-structured insurgent 
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and experience, comprise one of the most important cogs in the jihadist machine 
that is sweeping the Middle East.8 Ba’athists work behind the scenes running 
the organization’s operations—implementing religious norms, establishing services, 
shaping culture, and handling military operations—which gives Baghdadi a physical 
manifestation of political legitimacy as he works to build a functioning state.9 
Defining Insurgency and Legitimacy
This article defines Da’esh as an insurgency, but insurgency is an admittedly 
murky concept. For my purposes, an insurgency is a violent rebellion against 
a constituted authority (for example, a government recognized by the United 
Nations) where those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as bel-
ligerents.10 Peter Thompson, in his book Armed Groups: The 21st Century Threat, 
characterizes armed groups as international actors that constrain or expand state 
policies, but alternately can threaten stability, challenge legitimacy, kill or injure 
citizens, and prevent states from achieving sought-after goals.11 While these defi-
nitions seem relatively accurate, Da’esh boasts thousands of fighters, a structured 
organizational model, and strict internal discipline, and therefore seems to be 
much more than a textbook insurgency.
Kalevi Holsti, in his book The State, War, and the State of War, describes a state 
or ruler’s legitimacy in two different ways, based on whether it was established 
THE FORMER 
BA’ATHISTS COMPRISE 
ONE OF THE MOST 
IMPORTANT COGS IN 
THE JIHADIST MACHINE.
Map of territory claimed by ISIS (2014)
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vertically or horizontally.12 Vertical legitimacy rests on institutionalized authority, 
consent of the governed, and loyalty to the political foundations of the state, 
such as a formal constitution. Where vertical legitimacy defines itself around 
formal structures like contracts, elections, political institutions, and public organiza-
tions, horizontal legitimacy is less formal and more reliant on customs and 
norms. It centers on the people, community, and a set of shared beliefs—the 
nature of the community being ruled.13 Baghdadi is not an internationally 
recognized leader, nor is his state a formally recognized entity. Nevertheless, 
both the leader and his proclaimed state rely on the same sources of legitimacy 
that UN-recognized bodies claim. 
The Roots of Baghdadi’s Legitimacy as Caliph
Da’esh is no mere collection of radicals led by a random terrorist. It is a thoroughly 
Muslim group, prideful in its strict interpretation of the Qur’an and led by a 
man who has anointed himself through his interpretation of Islamic history 
and jurisprudence. Baghdadi has all of the necessary ideological and theological 
credentials to be the first caliph since the Ottoman Empire crumbled nearly 100 
years ago. Journalist Graeme Wood points out that Baghdadi has not only ter-
ritory to rule but also the will of the people behind him. Territorial control and 
Islamic legal precedence, however, are only pieces of the larger puzzle concerning 
Baghdadi’s legitimacy.14
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Da’esh are entirely unique from past insurgent groups. 
They do not seek international legitimacy within the UN framework of nation-
states. The opinions of kafirs (all non-believers) and apostates (any Muslims who 
do not agree with them) do not matter to them. How the international commu-
nity labels Da’esh is also irrelevant, and this is precisely what makes countering the 
group’s rhetoric so difficult: Baghdadi and Da’esh seek legitimacy from Allah and 
the ummah (the community of believers) alone. In Baghdadi’s view, the group’s 
course has been plotted and its legitimacy established strictly by following 
the Qur’an, and any person or governing body that diverges opposes not only 
Da’esh but Islam itself. Despite his indifference to the world’s opinion, however, 
Baghdadi’s behavior indicates that his legitimacy to current and prospective 
followers is one of his central concerns. Without a willing citizenry, his power 
base vanishes.15  
The care Baghdadi puts into his image is apparent in something as seemingly 
minor as his name. Born Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri, 
Baghdadi, at the age of 39, took his now famous nom de guerre, 
a double homage to his faith and his native land. Abu Bakr was 
Muhammad’s father-in-law and, after the Prophet’s death, the first 
caliph. Baghdad was the capital of the grandest caliphate in early 
Islam, the Abbasid dynasty. The Abbasids swept to power in the 
eighth century using clever apocalyptic propaganda and clandestine 
networks to mobilize popular anger against the ruling regime in 
Damascus.16
The widespread lack of education in the area where Da’esh operates contributes 
to Baghdadi’s carefully managed image. Where there is little education, religion 
is an influential weapon and one that Baghdadi does not hesitate to brandish 
BAGHDADI’S BEHAVIOR 
INDICATES THAT 
LEGITIMACY IS ONE 
OF HIS CENTRAL 
CONCERNS.
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whenever he can. His fundamentalist ideology adheres strictly to the words 
written in the Qur’an and stated by the Prophet Muhammad.   
Baghdadi knows the environment he operates in. The largest common denomi-
nator across the Middle East is Islam. Through shari’a law and the Qur’an, Bagh-
dadi offers his subjects justification for why he leads and why they should follow.  
Islamic Shariah (divine law) recognises the legitimacy of the ruler 
as long as he gains power by one of three ways: choice, allegiance, 
or conquest (as in giving legitimacy to something that cannot be 
alleviated, not as in setting up laws that make conquest possible). ... If 
... he issues rulings that coincide with Shariah, then his rulings must 
be followed, and if he goes against Shariah, he shall not be obeyed, 
and his ruling shall be protested according to the rules that govern 
disobedience in Shariah.17
His method for commanding respect is a multifaceted attack on his followers’ 
sensibilities, calibrated to achieve maximum results. Backed by Islamic texts and 
scripture, he validates his rule, galvanizes and legitimizes his followers, shames 
them with the threat of hellfire to secure their pledge of baya’a (allegiance), levies 
protection taxes on Christians, and explicitly commands archaic punishments to 
scare people into obedience.18   
Another angle Baghdadi uses to bolster his legitimacy is his family lineage. 
According to scripture, the caliph must be descended from the same tribe, the 
Qurayshi, as the Prophet, and Baghdadi is indeed Qurayshi.19 William McCants, 
a fellow at Brookings, explains,
The Islamic State’s spokesman proclaimed the return of God’s 
kingdom on earth, the caliphate, and Baghdadi reverted to his given 
name, preceded now with the ultimate title: Caliph Ibrahim. To 
justify this outsized claim, supporters circulated the genealogy of 
his tribe, which traced its lineage back to Muhammad’s descendants. 
This was considered an important qualification, for some Islamic 
prophecies of the End Times say a man descended from the Prophet 
will one day rule as caliph—an office that hasn’t existed since the 
fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I.20 
To further draw on his followers’ emotions, Baghdadi paraphrased a part of the 
speech the first caliph gave when he took power after Muhammad died: “I was 
appointed to rule you, but I am not the best among you. ... If you see me acting 
truly, then follow me. If you see me acting falsely, then advise and guide me. ... If 
I disobey God, then do not obey me.”21
Baghdadi uses Islam to reverse-engineer his own legitimacy by boosting the 
standing of his followers, a people largely uneducated and both economically 
and politically marginalized. In three separate speeches, he referred to scrip-
ture almost 40 times, expertly choosing ideas and phrases that would be most 
galvanizing for the people who were listening. Much in these speeches entails 
the need for Muslims to follow, fight, and expand Muslim lands. If the people 
follow Baghdadi, who is justified and of God, he told them, they gain legitimacy 
in the eyes of God. If they join Da’esh, they gain legitimacy. If they fight and kill 
IF FOLLOWERS FIGHT 
AND KILL THE KAFIR 




the kafir and apostates, they gain legitimacy. As the self-legitimacy of his fol-
lowers is bolstered, Baghdadi’s standing as both their leader and the spokesman 
of God is bolstered as well, because he provides the vehicle for their rise. This 
type of community-unifying rhetoric exemplifies Holsti’s horizontal axis of 
legitimacy, which rests on the people and their traditions rather than on formal 
institutions.22
For those individuals who do not fight or are skeptical about the new caliph’s 
rule, Baghdadi uses their devotion to God to shame them into submission. 
According to one expert on the rise of Baghdadi, there is “a Prophetic saying, 
that to die without pledging allegiance [to the Caliphate] is to die jahil (igno-
rant) and therefore die a ‘death of disbelief.’ ” 23 Baghdadi uses this fear of dying 
apostate and going to hell in an all-encompassing way that works against both 
his followers and opponents. Their religious zeal is the linchpin. If the people 
Baghdadi is targeting were not so devout, this tactic would likely falter, but 
because of their devotion to Islam, he engages in a form of psychological warfare 
to garner legitimacy, and it is quite effective. 
Baghdadi’s harsh coercive tactics can carry over into the macabre. He uses brutal 
Qur’anic punishments both to prove how closely he follows the Prophet’s teach-
ings and to terrorize people into submission. Until Da’esh assumed its current 
form in 2010, many of these violent punishments, such as chopping hands off 
for stealing or crucifying apostates, were considered barbaric and outdated. Al 
Qaeda’s leaders warned the lower tiers of their organization against using these 
harsh forms of punishment against fellow Muslims. Baghdadi, however, felt it 
was a way of legitimizing the new state he was founding as truly Islamic.24
Baghdadi takes advantage of poverty and lack of education to bolster his 
legitimacy among the populations under his control. The combination of these 
two elements makes the subjects of tyranny easier to manipulate. Many Muslims 
in prosperous countries live modern lives: men are monogamous, women drive 
cars and own property, and Muslim children attend coed schools and classes. In 
wealthy Western countries, religion has largely lost its social centrality. Western 
Iraq and eastern Syria, by contrast, are not modern. Much of the population 
still subsists on farming and animal husbandry as they have for centuries. 
This has led to poverty and literacy rates of approximately 19 percent and 80 
percent, respectively.25 What Muslims in these countries do not lack, however, is 
closeness to God. The Prophet Muhammad is their foundation, not Facebook, 
Twitter, or other modern “excesses.” Through the caliph, the poor become rich 
by a closer, more obedient relationship with the Prophet Muhammad.26  
With faith as a Muslim’s bedrock, what enemy can stand in the way of God, his 
proven caliph, and the momentum of thousands of other believers? More simply 
put: if God is for them, then who can stand against them? To a devout Sunni 
Muslim in Iraq or Syria, any opposition to Baghdadi and his interpretation of 
the Qur’an is likely to draw a large amount of hatred from the community. Ha-
tred itself has a tendency to unite people for one cause. This is where Baghdadi 
gets especially dangerous with religion: his legitimacy in the eyes of his subjects 
leads to an unquestioning and unified following that is internally self-policing. 
As Holsti points out, “In ancient states (and even in some contemporary states), 
the mysteries of religion were used to manufacture loyalty and compliance 
among subjects. Resistance was sacrilege and punishable by death.”27 As long as 
THROUGH THE CALIPH, 
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he keeps using Islamic jurisprudence as a tool to cow his followers, Baghdadi’s 
horizontal legitimacy is in no danger of diminishing.
Territorial Ownership, Security, and Provision of Services
Military officers, analysts, and government think tanks are at odds over whether 
Da’esh is a legitimate state and whether Baghdadi is the legitimate leader of a 
state. Those arguing against the idea note that the United Nations does not rec-
ognize either, that the group claimed power illegally, and that Da’esh is accused 
of committing genocide against religious minorities in Iraq.28 Da’esh’s control of 
territory across Syria and Iraq, however, is evidence enough to undermine argu-
ments against Baghdadi’s and Da’esh’s legitimacy.
Holding territory provides Baghdadi with a lot more than simply the prestige of 
land ownership. With territory, he can implement many secondary, supporting 
initiatives that bolster his legitimacy among his followers. Most importantly, it 
allows him to provide security, law, government, and services at the grassroots 
level of society. As of 2016, Baghdadi controls roughly 78,000 square kilometers 
(30,000 square miles) of territory in Syria and Iraq.29 Within this large swath of 
land, Baghdadi invests heavily in the people, providing services and installing a 
responsive Islamic government. In one of his first addresses to the public after 
declaring himself Caliph, Baghdadi encouraged migration to the caliphate by 
calling for “people with military, administrative, and service expertise, and 
medical doctors and engineers of all different specializations.”30 Clearly he wanted 
to make improvements to infrastructure, health care, government, and security.  
It should be remembered that Baghdadi is concerned with services, amenities, 
security, laws, and the general welfare of the people because he holds the terri-
tory they live in. Without land, there would be no citizens, and there would be 
no concern for their welfare. Without land and the people who live on it, there 
would be no need for security and no reason to impose a government. Without 
land and people, in other words, there is no legitimacy. Journalist Graeme Wood 
asserts, “Control of territory is an essential precondition for [Da’esh’s] authority 
in the eyes of its supporters. ... Where it holds power, the state collects taxes, 
regulates prices, operates courts, and administers services ranging from health 
care and education to telecommunications.”31 
Sources such as Vice News and CNN’s Jürgen Todenhöfer (the first Western 
journalist to visit Da’esh and report from Raqqa, Syria) indicate that the group 
has indeed improved upon the standards of living in its area of control.32 While 
many Western critics may argue against this conclusion, Baghdadi has given 
the people living under him a sense of predictability, with standards and rules 
to live by. People know what to expect. Under Syrian president Bashar al-Assad 
and the former prime minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, there was little or no 
predictability to government actions or the availability of services, especially 
for marginalized Sunnis. Hence, even if some residents of Raqqa and Mosul 
disagree with some of Da’esh’s questionable actions, Sunni Muslims, at least, 
have also experienced many positive outcomes. According to a book on Da’esh 
by Arab journalist Abel Bari Atwan, Da’esh government operations are in place 
at both high and low levels. This includes a Shari’a Council that sets penalties, 
local shari’a courts, and a shari’a police force that is charged with protecting the 
virtues of Islamic law.33  
BAGHDADI HAS GIVEN 
THE PEOPLE LIVING 




Both civilians and police can bring complaints before the courts, which handle 
all judicial issues, religious and civil. Citizens in rural areas where the central 
government has been largely absent find these courts very useful. Shari’a 
courts process cases efficiently and relatively fairly, and their justice is said to 
be impartial.34 In the Iraqi and Syrian territories under Da’esh’s control, where, 
historically, corruption has run rampant, even those in positions of authority are 
now subject to the same punishments as the civilian population. Additionally, 
polls conducted in Raqqa and Mosul indicate a consensus that crime is virtually 
non-existent, largely because of the deterrence posed by extreme methods of 
punishment. Societal stability and a general lack of crime lend credence to a 
ruler’s claims of legitimacy.35 
Security and governance have improved since Baghdadi took over Da’esh, but 
education, job opportunities, and even modernist ideals like equality are also on 
the rise. According to Bari Atwan’s interviews with non-extremist residents in 
Mosul, there is a renewed focus on youth education in the city. Baghdadi’s Edu-
cation Councils oversee the majority of the religious curriculum. Most sciences 
are now offered, although those that don’t fit with Islam, such as evolutionary 
biology, are cast aside. What is more, though schoolteachers once went months 
without pay, they now receive monthly salaries.36 
Western media vilify Da’esh for practices that promote inequality, but shock-
ingly, reports indicate that Baghdadi has become slightly more “progressive.” 
In a break from many traditional Middle Eastern societies, in which women 
have very limited access to education or the societal roles enjoyed by their 
male counterparts, Baghdadi has opened all-female schools and universities for 
regular attendance.37 Whether his administration creates civilian-sector jobs 
for newly educated women remains a question, but Da’esh has established an 
all-female shari’a police brigade called al-Khansa to go along with the all-male 
Hizbeh police force.38
Baghdadi’s investment in the people of this territory boosts his legitimacy as a 
ruler not only at the community and state level, but also to some outsiders, for 
whom Da’esh and Baghdadi could appear to be a legitimate option for regional 
governance. Security, stability, services, education, and ethnic representation are 
highly enticing opportunities in an area of the Middle East where these basic ele-
ments of civil life have long been scarce. Baghdadi’s hold on this territory allows 
him to operate freely within it, including taking the necessary steps to normalize 
his and his organization’s legitimacy for current and future followers. Based on 
the provision of basic services, increased social stability, and the imposition of 
the rule of law—however severe, Baghdadi is a strong candidate for placement 
on Holsti’s horizontal axis of legitimation, while his ability to hold territory and 
the military might he wields place him on the vertical axis as well.39
The Baghdadi-Ba’athist Nexus
One other way that Da’esh’s leader has been able to establish his legitimacy 
within the territories under his control is what can be called the “Baghdadi-
Ba’athist Nexus.” Until the beginning of 2015, little was known about the inner 
workings and structure of Baghdadi’s organization, but intelligence sources 
indicate that he maintains a tight relationship with the people working under 
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Ba’athist Party. These government professionals were turned out of office and 
ostracized by the Coalition Provisional Authority after the United States in-
vaded Iraq in 2003.40 Baghdadi met many of his Ba’athist followers while he was 
incarcerated at the US-run prison in Iraq called Camp Bucca.41 The prisoners 
laid the groundwork for the Islamic State as it is today—an organization that is 
extremely hierarchical and highly disciplined across its lines.
Baghdadi delegates some decision making and command authority to his 
Ba’athist followers, which takes the administrative burden off of him and the 
operational cadres of Da’esh; ensures against stove-piped leadership; and allows 
his closest functionaries to feel empowered—something very important in 
many Middle Eastern cultures. Through this decentralized structure and shared 
responsibility, Baghdadi ensures that Da’esh will maintain legitimacy even if he is 
killed. The effect this has on the organization is significant: legitimacy no longer 
stops with the titular leader but includes the group’s upper echelons of leader-
ship, which in turn boosts resolve, output, and organizational sustainment. By 
building his team and entrusting Da’esh’s future to it, Baghdadi has ensured that 
Da’esh manifests itself outwardly through the Ba’athist leaders’ successes.42  
According to American and Iraqi intelligence analysts,
Baghdadi delegates authority to his cabinet, or shura council, which 
includes ministers of war, finance, religious affairs and others. The 
Islamic State’s leadership under Mr. Baghdadi has drawn mainly from 
two pools: veterans of Al Qaeda in Iraq who survived the insurgency 
against American forces with battle-tested militant skills, and former 
Ba’athist officers under Saddam Hussein with expertise in organiza-
tion, intelligence, and international security. It is a merger of these 
two skill sets that has made the organization such a potent force, the 
officials say. … “Baghdadi is to a certain extent a religious figurehead 
designed to grant an aura of religious legitimacy and respectability 
to the group’s operations, while the real power brokers are a core of 
former military and intelligence officials.”43
If, as argued here, legitimacy is one important byproduct of a citizenry’s loyalty, 
which in turn is based on a ruler’s shaping of the physical and emotional environ-
ment, then this is exactly what the Ba’athist nexus does for Baghdadi. The former 
Iraqi officials heavily influence or manipulate the environment under Da’esh 
control, and Baghdadi gets the credit without having to manage the nuanced 
operations of religious cleansing, the provision of services, and future military 
planning. If well-trained Ba’athist leaders were not managing operations and 
helping to make Da’esh legitimate in the eyes of those it governs, it is possible 
that Baghdadi would not have succeeded in the same manner over such a 
relatively short period of time.  
Conclusion
Baghdadi’s legitimacy is complex and has been established across several axes of 
his organization and territory. The international community must target several 
focal points on each axis to defeat him. Though his ideological influence is huge 
and somewhat intangible to many observers in the West, much of Baghdadi’s 
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legitimacy relies on factors that are readily visible, such as territory, organization, 
and societal infrastructure. The ideological standing that he has established on 
the basis of religious zealotry, however, is the factor that Western countermeasures 
are least likely to affect.44 Individuals from abroad who join Da’esh are called 
“radicalized” for a reason.
There is, however, an ebb and flow to any regime’s legitimacy. To go back to 
Holsti’s schema of legitimacy: “Legitimacy is thus a variable rather than a 
constant. Its vertical and horizontal dimensions are critical components of a 
state’s strength, but that strength may wax and wane” depending on numerous 
factors.45 Rooted as it is in the towns and cities Da’esh controls, tackling Bagh-
dadi’s societal, cultural, and Islamic legitimacy is harder than retaking ground. 
Undermining his standing cannot be done through air power and air strikes 
alone; it must be done with ground troops. Whether local forces are up to the 
challenge is debatable. Until the international community makes the conscious 
decision to take back Baghdadi’s territory (and fully embrace everything encom-
passed in that decision), resolve within Da’esh will not weaken. Baghdadi and 
his followers also know the United States is reluctant to undertake the kinds of 
stability operations that will be imperative should Da’esh be defeated. This only 
increases Baghdadi’s strength and allure.
Land is important to Baghdadi. If his opponents are going to take away the 
legitimacy Baghdadi has already established, it is imperative to take away the 
thing he covets most—his real estate. Within the bounds of Da’esh’s territory, 
he has the ability to do many things that will help normalize his command and 
legitimacy in the eyes of his followers, the population he controls, and the out-
side world: project military strength, accrue more of it, secure the people under 
him, maintain a command structure, and do the things necessary to bolster 
social welfare at the local level, such as provide services. Without a caliphate, the 
self-proclaimed caliph is merely a low-level, power-hungry jihadist, and Da’esh is 
just a rebel faction unknown to the international community.  ²
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
MAJ Eric East currently serves as a foreign area officer in the US Army.
This is a work of the US federal government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 
United States. Foreign copyrights may apply.
IT IS IMPERATIVE 





1  Editor’s note: In this essay, the author prefers to use the Arabic 
name Da’esh for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria rather than the 
English acronym ISIS.
2  Flora Drury, “ISIS Chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Bans Extremist 
Group from Releasing Any More Graphic Execution Videos 
to ‘Spare the Feelings of Fellow Muslims and Their Children’,” 





4 Patrick Cockburn, “War with ISIS: Islamic Militants Have 
Army of 200,000, Claims Senior Kurdish Leader,” Independent, 
15 November 2014: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/middle-east/war-with-isis-islamic-militants-have-
army-of-200000-claims-kurdish-leader-9863418.html 
5  See “This is the Promise of Allah,” Daesh’s declaration from 2014: 
https://ia902505.us.archive.org/28/items/poa_25984/EN.pdf
6 Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic, March 
2015: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/
what-isis-really-wants/384980/ 
7 Christopher Reuter, “Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic 






CTX | Vol. 6, No. 3
10 This is based on the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. 
“insurgency.”
11 Peter Thompson, Armed Groups: The 21st Century Threat 
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 5–8.
12 Kalevi Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
13 Ibid., 87–90.
14 Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants.”
15 Bernard Haykel and William McCants, “The Islamic State: 
Understanding Its Ideology and Theology,” interview by Michael 
Cromartie at the May 2015 Faith Angle Forum in South Beach, 
Florida: http://eppc.org/publications/bernard-haykel-and-
william-mccants-at-the-may-2015-faith-angle-forum/ ; William 
McCants, “‘The Believer’: How an Introvert with a Passion for 
Religion and Soccer Became Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Leader of 
the Islamic State,” Brookings, 1 September 2015: http://www.
brookings.edu/research/essays/2015/thebeliever ; Wood, “What 
ISIS Really Wants.” 
16 McCants, “‘The Believer.’”
17 Motaz al-Khateeb, “Daesh’s Intellectual Origins: From 





19 Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants.” 
20 McCants, “‘The Believer.’”
21 Ibid.
22 “In New Audio Speech, Islamic State (ISIS) Leader Al-
Baghdadi Issues Call to Arms to All Muslims,” MEMRI 
Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, 14 May 2015: http://
www.memrijttm.org/in-new-audio-speech-islamic-state-isis-
leader-al-baghdadi-issues-call-to-arms-to-all-muslims.html.
23 Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants.”
24 McCants, “‘The Believer.’”
25 “Iraq Poverty Rate to Reach 30%,” WAAR Media, 20 April 2015: 
http://waarmedia.com/english/iraq-poverty-rate-to-reach-30/ ; 
“Iraq,” US Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book, accessed 
12 October 2015: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html
26 Matthew Timmerman, “Poverty and Conflict in the Middle East,” 
Atlantic Council, 31 July 2014: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
blogs/menasource/poverty-and-conflict-in-the-middle-east
27 Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, 91.
28 This is based on the author’s discussions with other military 
professionals and graduate school instructors. 
29 This area is about the size of the Czech Republic or a little less 
than the area of the US state of South Carolina. (These numbers 
do not account for the areas under Da’esh control in Africa and 
elsewhere in the Middle East.) Total population estimates for 
the areas of Syria and Iraq under recent Da’esh’s control range 
widely, from 5.25 million to 10 million. About two-thirds of this 
population is in Iraq. 
30 Musa Cerantonio, comment on Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants.”
31 Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants.” 
32 Jürgen Todenhöfer, “Rare Access to ISIS Territory in Syria and 
Iraq,” interview by Frederick Pleitgen, CNN, video, 22 December 
2014: http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/12/22/exclusive-
rare-access-to-isis-territory-in-syria-and-iraq/ ; “The Islamic State,” 
Vice News, 26 December 2014: https://news.vice.com/video/
the-islamic-state-full-length
33 Malise Ruthven, “Inside the Islamic State,” review of Islamic 
State: The Digital Caliphate, by Abdel Bari Atwan, New York 
Review of Books, 9 July 2015: http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/2015/07/09/inside-islamic-state/
34 No one knows what is said behind closed doors; however, coercion 
has played a large part in Iraq’s culture up until now and may 
continue to do so even under Da’esh.
35 Ruthven, “Inside the Islamic State.”
36 Abdel Bari Atwan, Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate (London: 
Saqi Books, 2015). 
37 Ibid.
38 Sarah Birke, “How ISIS Rules,” New York Review of Books, 5 
February 2015: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/02/05/
how-isis-rules/
39 Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War; Wood, “What ISIS 
Really Wants.”
40 Denise Natali, “The Islamic State’s Baathist Roots,” Al-
Monitor, 24 April 2015: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2015/04/baathists-behind-the-islamic-state.html ; 
Reuter, “Secret Files.”
41 Terrence McCoy, “How the Islamic State Evolved in an American 
Prison,” Washington Post, 4 November 2014: https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/11/04/
how-an-american-prison-helped-ignite-the-islamic-state/
42 Reuter, “Secret Files.”
43 Eric Schmitt and Ben Hubbard, “ISIS Leader Takes Steps to 
Ensure Group’s Survival,” New York Times, 20 July 2015: http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/middleeast/isis-strategies-
include-lines-of-succession-and-deadly-ring-tones.html?_r=0
44 Haykel and McCants, “The Islamic State.”
45 Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, 90.
August 2016
15
Radicalization and Deradicalization: 
Norwegian Foreign Fighters in Syria
CPT Marius Kristiansen,  
Norwegian Armed Forces
A distinctive feature of certain armed conflicts over the 
last 30 years is the involvement of unpaid, radicalized Muslim foreign fighters 
who do not have any personal stake in the conflict besides a particular kind 
of religious belief.1 People become foreign fighters for reasons that depend on 
several factors that differ from one conflict to another.
Norway, a relatively small country with only five million inhabitants, is one of 
several European countries that have seen a substantial number (per capita) of 
their citizens leave to become foreign fighters in Syria.2 The Norwegian govern-
ment has developed a comprehensive plan to prevent radicalization, with some 
success, but radical beliefs that lead to extremism or even violent action are not 
limited to certain Muslims or a particular end of the political spectrum. Norway 
and other countries must do more first to understand why some people become 
radicalized enough to take violent action in the name of any cause, and then to 
develop policies to counteract those processes. It is difficult to find scholarly 
sources for this topic, especially on the profiling of Norwegian foreign fighters, 
mainly because they are still such a new phenomenon. Adding to the difficulty, 
most of the research in this area has been conducted by the Norwegian Police 
Security Service and the Norwegian Intelligence Service, and is therefore classi-
fied. Available open sources include social media statements, pictures, and blogs. 
In the process of writing this article, I was fortunate to be able to discuss the 
topics of profiling and assessment with some leading terrorism researchers at the 
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and the University of Oslo.
Profile of a Norwegian Jihadi
The conflict in Syria had drawn 30 to 40 Norwegian foreign fighters to the 
region by the end of December 2013, according to several reports.3 By late 2015, 
that estimated number had grown to more than 80, and as of mid-2016, the 
numbers are still higher.4 Most of these individuals are men, but at least two 
women are also known to have joined the fight in Syria.5 These foreign fighters 
are using violence in an unlawful manner and can therefore be categorized as 
terrorists from both a Norwegian and an international perspective. It is pos-
sible to profile several of these Norwegian fighters and analyze their radicaliza-
tion process, because some of them have made official statements to the media 
and spoken at public events organized by semi-official organizations. The 
group with the most active profile and a record of official appearances is called 
Profetens Ummah (“The Prophets’ Community”), whose leaders have connec-
tions with recognized international radical Muslim communities and indi-
viduals.6 One well-known radical British imam, Anjem Choudary, for example, 
has been working alongside his Norwegian counterparts and has supported 
their efforts to widen their influence in Norway.7
The education level of the Norwegians who commit to jihad and become foreign 
fighters varies, but most do not possess a college degree. Many of them had jobs 
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in Norway, but some were entirely dependent on the Norwegian welfare system. 
Young men aged 20 to 30 from the eastern part of Norway predominated in this 
jobless group, and most of them were affiliated with Profetens Ummah.8 Several 
of those who went to Syria are related, and most of them are friends who have 
known each other for a long time.9 Most of the Norwegian foreign fighters have 
ethnic connections to the northern parts of Africa and are therefore Muslim by 
birth and family culture, but the group also includes a few ethnic Norwegians, 
several of whom converted to Islam.10 It may be worth noting that a number of 
the most overt participants in this cohort come from one city, Fredrikstad, and 
were part of a close football (soccer) community there. This finding was echoed 
in a documentary presented in 2015 by the Norwegian television broadcaster 
Norsk Rikskringkasting (NRK).11 One Norwegian killed while fighting in Syria, for 
example, was a close friend of one of Norway’s most famous football players.12
Why Do Norwegians Become Foreign Fighters in Syria?
There are a number of reasons why people devote themselves to becoming 
foreign fighters. It may take a long time for a person to become so committed 
to the jihadi cause that he is willing to sacrifice his life for it, but this process 
can happen quickly in some circumstances. This holds true for the Norwegian 
foreign fighters as well. The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and the 
University of Oslo have tried to identify the reasons that Norwegians go to Syria 
and, in a preliminary conclusion, highlight four major motivations.13 
Political and religious idealism: Several of the individuals who have stated 
that they are going or are likely to go to Syria to fight think it is the right thing 
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to do based on a political or religious conviction. Many people in this group 
are fighting against the Syrian regime because of their perception that the 
government violates human rights, while others regard the Syrian civil war as a 
fight between good and evil. This group includes those who are motivated by 
martyrdom.14 
A shift from humanitarian ideals to jihad: A small number of the Norwegians 
who are fighting in Syria were originally motivated to go there to provide 
humanitarian aid, not to fight. Because of various circumstances, however, 
this motivation changed, and instead of becoming aid workers, they became 
fighters.15












Attention, recognition, and fame: Some of the Norwegians who went to fight 
in Syria were purely motivated by a desire for recognition or fame. Most of the 
people belonging to this group are not Muslims by birth, but are ethnic Nor-
wegians who converted to Islam before traveling to Syria. A few were not at all 
religious when they went but were attracted to the fight by some romantic idea 
of their own. Several of the people in this category use social media extensively, 
because they seek the attention that a high media profile can potentially give 
them. A comparison could be made between these fighters and participants in 
reality TV shows. This group is responsible for the birth of the so-called “Para-
dise Hotel jihadist.”16
A window of opportunity: A few of the Norwegian contingent of fighters in 
Syria are motivated by the fact that they can do things in Syria they would not 
be able to do elsewhere without being punished, such as killing people or using 
drugs. Others in this group want to become terrorists, but they do not want to 
conduct acts of terrorism in their own “neighborhood.”17 The majority of 
the expatriate group simply want to go to Syria and do things without any-
body controlling them. Young people who have been living under a strict 
religious regime imposed by their parents constitute the majority of this group.18 
Similarities with Radicalization in Other Parts of Europe 
In his chapter of the book, Understanding Violent Radicalisation: Terrorist and 
Jihadist Movements in Europe, Petter Nesser presents three general motivational 
paths to jihad through radicalization that are prevalent in Europe.19 He describes 
them as: “entrepreneurs and protégés,” who seem to be motivated mainly by 
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ideology and activism, and who often act as recruiters in the radicalization 
process; “misfits,” whose main motivation appears to be personal grievances, 
problems, and frustrations; and “drifters,” who appear to be well-functioning 
individuals but who frequently have mixed motivations for joining and may be 
easily swayed by relatives and friends who are extremists. These paths correlate to 
a large extent with the Norwegian radicalization process outlined in this article.
Radicalization Triggers for Potential Norwegian Foreign Fighters
Two key triggers explain why some people from Norway radicalize to the extent 
that they become foreign fighters in Syria.20
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First, in Norway, there has been a competition for influence among several 
semi-official Islamic organizations, led by Profetens Ummah and Islam Net. 
These two organizations have been using official media and unofficial blogs to 
argue against one another for years.21 The Syrian conflict represents an opportu-
nity for members from both organizations to show that they are brave enough 
to participate in a real war in the name of Allah. Before either one reached the 
threshold of actually sending members to Syria, the two organizations escalated 
the level of rhetorical conflict in Norway by publicly provoking each other to the 
point of no return.22 The result was that some Norwegians devoted themselves to 
the fight in Syria to prove their faith. In my assessment, this ideological contest 
became the main reason for such extreme radicalization.
Second, despite the fact that the Syrian civil war is one of the most devastating 
conflicts seen in many years, the international community does not appear 
willing to become involved. Millions of children, along with their families and 
others, have become refugees in their own country.23 The fact that the rest of the 
world, including Norway, is apparently indifferent to the suffering of the Syrian 
people is a potential source of frustration and anger in groups that are suscep-
tible to radicalization. In combination with some of the other motivational 
factors described in this article, I believe such a sense of outrage is likely to be a 
significant factor, or even a trigger, in the radicalization of Norwegians who go 
to Syria as foreign fighters. 
Norway’s Plan for Deradicalization
The Norwegian government’s general plan for deradicalization is currently 
being reconstructed. The current “Action Plan to Prevent Radicalization and 
Violent Extremism” states that the issues of radicalization and deradicalization 
are domestic problems that fall under the mandate of the police.24 If radicaliza-
tion takes place in an “international context,” that is, outside of Norway, then 
the responsibility belongs to the Norwegian Intelligence Service. The main goal 
of this plan is to develop a preventive dialogue to influence persons who could 
potentially become radicalized.25 Local police, it says, should try to prevent 
radicalization through dialogue with the individuals or groups that are assessed 
to be susceptible, while Norwegian society as a whole is urged to motivate young 
people to complete school and higher education. Both leading researchers and 
leading police officials have criticized the current plan quite extensively. When 
it was first presented, one prominent researcher, Brynjar Lia, denounced it as 
nothing more than a “PR move” by the Norwegian government.26  
Triggers That Have Deradicalized Norwegian Foreign Fighters
Norwegians who traveled to Syria as foreign fighters have reacted differently to 
their experiences. Some individuals who returned to Norway became even more 
radicalized, while several others turned away from radicalism altogether. A few 
of those who renounced jihad received help from public authorities to complete 
the process, an option that is included in the Norwegian government’s current 
“Action Plan.” 27 The ones who did not require any external influence to give up 
jihad did so because of a change in motivation, which came about for two main 
reasons. The first came from the fighters’ realization that their perception of 
the conflict in Syria was far from its reality. They did not change their opinion 
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what they expected.28 The second group did change their opinion of what is right 
and wrong after experiencing what is actually taking place in Syria.29  
Conclusion
In my opinion, Norway clearly faces serious challenges regarding radicalization, 
and the problem extends far beyond the current hot topic of religious extremism. 
The Norwegian challenge, as I see it, comes not only from religious extremism, 
but reaches across the political spectrum from neo-Nazis and right-wing extrem-
ists on the one hand, to animal-rights proponents and left-wing extremists on 
the other. It is high time for the Norwegian government to reconstruct Norway’s 
approach to the challenges that every kind of radicalization presents. 
The work has started, but it is far from finalized.30 My hope is that the results of 
Norway’s efforts to fight radicalization will be more than another general plan 
for which only the Ministry of Justice has responsibility. A broader, whole-of-
government approach will not be easy, nor are there likely to be any quick fixes in 
this matter. I do believe, however, that what Norway needs to cope with the chal-
lenges that radicalization presents is a comprehensive plan involving a number of 
ministries, departments, and other governmental agencies. Although it is outside 
the scope of this article to describe such a plan in detail, I want to emphasize that 
any plan that has sufficient magnitude to produce the needed effects will require 
a heartfelt commitment from all levels of Norwegian society and the Norwegian 
people as a whole.  ²
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The 1990 Siege of Batticaloa: A Tribute to 
the Warriors of the Gemunu Watch
BG (Ret.) Hiran N. Halangode,  
Sri Lankan Army
The rifleman fights without promise of reward or relief. Behind 
every river there’s another hill and behind that hill, another river. 
After weeks or months in the line, only a wound can offer him the 
comfort of safety, shelter, and a bed. Those who are left to fight, fight 
on, evading death but knowing that with each day of evasion they 
have exhausted one more chance for survival. Sooner or later, unless 
victory comes, this chase must end on the litter or in the grave.
 — General Omar N. Bradley1
Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) is an island nation in the Indian 
Ocean off the southeast tip of India. Most of the land is flat and rolling, with 
mountains in the south-central region rising to over 8,000 feet (2,438 meters). 
The two nations are separated by the Palk Strait, which is only 18 miles (29 kilo-
meters) wide at the closest point between Rameswaram in the southern Indian 
state of Tamil Nadu and Talaimannar in northern Sri Lanka.
Indo-Aryan emigration from India in the fifth century BCE led to the forma-
tion of the largest ethnic group on Sri Lanka today, the Sinhala. Tamils, the 
second-largest ethnic group on the island, were originally from the Tamil region 
of South India and emigrated between the third century BCE and 1200 CE. The 
Tamils, primarily Hindus, claimed the northern section of the island while the 
Sinhala, who are predominantly Buddhist, controlled the rest of Ceylon. Begin-
ning in 1505, Ceylon became a colony, first of the 
Portuguese empire, then of the Dutch East India 
Company (1658–1796), and eventually, of the 
British Empire (1802–1948). The British brought 
indentured labor from South India to work 
their coffee, tea, and rubber plantations, thereby 
displacing many Sinhala in the central highlands 
of Kandy. On 4 February 1948, after 443 years of 
colonial rule and under pressure from Ceylonese 
nationalist leaders, Ceylon became a self-governing 
dominion of the Commonwealth of Nations. The 
name was changed to Sri Lanka (“Resplendent 
Island”) in 1972.
The Ceylon Army (first instated on 10 October 
1949) was deployed in 1951 to assist the police 
in preventing illicit immigration and smuggling 
between Ceylon and Tamil Nadu in India. This 
was in addition to its other task of assisting the 
government in maintaining essential services. The 
problem of poaching and smuggling in the shallow 
waters off the northern coast continues to this 
day and has had a profound impact on relations 
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between the two countries. Such illicit activities also remained a center of 
dispute during the civil conflict.
Ever since independence, the Tamil minority in the north of Sri Lanka has 
harbored resentment towards the Sinhalese majority due to political, economic, 
and social differences, exacerbated by the differences in culture and religion. 
The Tamils claimed that Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike championed 
Sinhala nationalism and further marginalized the Tamil minority when he 
made Sinhala the country’s official language and institutionalized state support 
of Buddhism in 1956.2 
In the 1970s, the insurgent group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
arose in the country’s north, with the goal to win independence for the majority 
Tamil regions of Sri Lanka and create a greater Eelam (“Precious Land”) aligned 
with the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.3 In 1975, the Tamil mayor of Jaffna was 
killed by the separatists simply for holding a government office. After a govern-
ment crackdown in the north, some Tamils crossed to Tamil Nadu as refugees, 
many moderate Tamils who had been living among the Sinhala in other parts 
of the country fled to the north, and a few migrated to Western countries and 
formed the Tamil diaspora. The Tamil Nadu government supported, financed, 
and gave refuge to Tamil rebel groups, allowing them to operate clandestinely 
from Indian territory. The Indians also helped train and arm certain Tamil guerrilla 
groups to fight the Sri Lankan Armed Forces after Sinhala racial riots in July 1983 
that resulted from the ambush of a Sri Lankan Army patrol in the north.
The first of a series of five peace talks and many ceasefires was arranged by the 
Indian government in Thimpu, Bhutan, in 1985. At this meeting, the five main 
Tamil rebel groups presented four demands to the Sri Lankan government: 
1. Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality.  
2. Recognition of the right of the Sri Lankan Tamils to an identified 
homeland. 
3. Recognition of the right of self-determination for the Tamil nation.
4. Recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all 
Tamils living in Sri Lanka.
The government of Sri Lanka rejected outright the four demands put forward 
by the Tamil rebels but agreed to recognize the right to citizenship of the 
descendants of the indentured labor force brought from India by the British in 
the nineteenth century.4 It was this situation that led to the commencement of 
violence and the initial stages of the long civil conflict. During the mid-1980s, 
the LTTE pushed out the other Tamil rebel groups and took charge as the sole 
representatives of Sri Lanka’s Tamil people and the dominant Tamil militant 
group in northern Sri Lanka.
In the face of brutal terrorist attacks on civilians and India’s continued support 
for the insurgency, the Sri Lankan government launched a major military opera-
tion in 1987 to liberate the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE. After it successfully 
completed that operation, it was then poised to liberate the town of Jaffna and 
nearby areas, but the LTTE fighters fled to Tamil Nadu. Continued support for 
the insurgency from India forced the two sides into what is known as the Indo-
Lanka Accord of 1987, which secured India’s national interest but sadly didn’t 
meet the Sri Lankan state’s needs or the LTTE’s basic aspirations.
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The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) arrived in Sri Lanka in July 1987 to bring 
about peace, but it only brought about more bloodshed. One thousand fifty-five 
IPKF soldiers were killed and many more were wounded during the IPKF’s nearly 
three-year tour of duty in Sri Lanka’s northeast. In 1990, the new president of Sri 
Lanka, R. Premadasa, made a second attempt at peace talks with the LTTE to try 
to settle the conflict, facilitate the withdrawal of the IPKF, and bring peace to Sri 
Lanka. This is the point at which this story begins.5
Batticaloa
To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of 
preserving peace. 
 — George Washington6
With the departure of the Indian peacekeeping forces at the end of March 
1990, the LTTE gradually pushed out the rival Tamil National Army and took 
control of Sri Lanka’s northeast, which had been vacated by the IPKF under the 
terms of the peace accord. The Tigers positioned their cadres 
in vital areas that enabled them to exert pressure on both 
the provincial police and the army, whose troops were very 
thinly deployed in the northeast to counter the insurgents. 
In the Eastern Province, just one infantry battalion (typically 
500–600 men) was deployed in each of the districts of Am-
para, Batticaloa (BCO), and Trincomalee.7
Five army detachments were established in the towns of Wella-
wadi, Kiran, Kaluwanchikudy, Kalmunai, and Kallady in the 
BCO district. Out of these detachments, the ones at Kalmunai 
(in the Ampara district) and Kalawanchikudy belonged to the 
Sixth Battalion Sri Lanka Light Infantry (Sixth SLLI), which 
had only just been raised in late May 1990. The older infantry 
battalions were somewhat handicapped because they had been 
required to transfer one rifle company and composite platoons 
to these newly raised infantry battalions. The troops had to 
reorient themselves from a limited-engagement environment 
in the south to an all-out counterinsurgency environment in 
the north and east. The men of the First Battalion, Gemunu 
Watch (First GW), under my command, however, had already 
prepared themselves both professionally and psychologically 
during their 10-month tenure at Ampara. They saw the LTTE 
annihilate the rival Tamil National Army following the 
withdrawal of the Indian peacekeepers and had given refuge to 
20 or 30 Tamil National Army soldiers who fled from the LTTE 
attacks into Ampara.
First GW was redeployed to the BCO district on 18 May 1990. 
By then, the situation in the district was very tense. The LTTE 
had 30 or 40 outposts with bunkers in the town and vicinity, 
each of which was manned by 150 to 300 LTTE cadres. These 
insurgents obstructed the movement of the security forces, 
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provoked the army, and interfered with the police who were trying to maintain 
law and order. 
A large LTTE bunker had been built near the town’s clock tower, across a lagoon 
from the BCO police station, where it covered the approach into town. Permis-
sion was required from the LTTE to visit most areas in town, while LTTE fighters 
reserved the use of many local services, such as certain garages and service 
stations, exclusively for themselves.
This situation was brought to the notice of the military higher command and the 
civilian bureaucracy, who were negotiating peace with the LTTE at that time. But 
the security forces were explicitly told to cooperate with the LTTE to bring about 
a peaceful settlement to the conflict, because the country couldn’t afford another 
battle with the LTTE. The president and the civilian bureaucracy did not fully 
understand the situation on the ground, in large part because the military higher 
command did not make the difficulties faced by security forces in the Eastern 
Province clear to the government. The commanders did not want to jeopardize 
their careers by seeming to question official policy.
The Siege of Batticaloa Begins, 11 June 1990
On the night of Sunday, 10 June 1990, a Sinhala woman was caught by her 
husband while she was with a young Muslim LTTE supporter. The two men 
fought, and both were brought to the BCO town police station. The LTTE, who 
were looking for an opportunity to commence their campaign of violence, 
surrounded the police station and demanded the release of the Muslim youth. 
When the police informed them that the youth had been admitted to the BCO 
hospital, the LTTE insisted that he was not in the hospital and pressed their 
demand for his release. They disarmed the policemen on guard, took over the 
police station, and seized its armory, communications equipment, and all the 
gold and money that was being kept there for safe custody. (The LTTE later 
abducted the young man from the hospital.)
At this time, I was the commanding officer of First GW, which was then located 
approximately two kilometers away from the BCO police station at the Kallady 
Camp. (I had been in Ampara immediately before taking up my duties in BCO.) 
Although I was also the coordinating officer of the BCO district, the police 
did not inform me at all about the developing situation. At 0620 on 11 June, a 
Monday, the owner of the local L.H. Bakery, who happened to be one of my 
school friends, informed me by telephone that all the Sinhala in the town of Bat-
ticaloa were ordered by the LTTE to vacate the town within five minutes. Because 
I was unaware of the prevailing situation prior to this message, I had dispatched 
two of my platoons (two officers and 60 soldiers) to Ampara for their annual 
weapons training classification test just two hours previously.
At around 0730, I was told that a vehicle carrying 10 soldiers from Kalawanchi-
kudy Army Camp (the base of the Sixth SLLI) had been ambushed at Kalmunai 
and all of the soldiers had been killed. Kalawanchikudy Camp had only 48 
troops, along with three officers. There was no way anyone could even move 
out to Kalmunai to recover the bodies, because the main road was now blocked 
by the LTTE, which had taken up a position surrounding the Kalawanchikudy 
Camp and the police station. (The police station was located next to the army 
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camp on the Ampara–Batticaloa road.) The LTTE fighters 
demanded that the policemen surrender, announcing that 
they would not be harmed but would be handed over 
to the Sri Lankan government at the BCO airfield. Ten 
Sinhalese policemen escaped the deadly fate of the other 
policemen by jumping over the fence into the adjoining 
army camp, carrying their weapons and ammunition. 
Captain Sarath Embowa of the Sixth SLLI was the com-
manding officer of the Kalawanchikudy Camp. He decided 
to fight the terrorists.
The LTTE fighters, who were in touch with the Sri Lankan 
Air Force base in Batticaloa (SLAF BCO), made the same 
promise to the officials there: if the police surrendered 
without resistance, they would be handed over to govern-
ment forces. The police, who were not prepared mentally or 
physically to fight a ruthless guerrilla organization without 
military air and artillery support, agreed to surrender to the 
LTTE. By this time, the LTTE had surrounded most of the 
13 police stations in both the BCO and Ampara districts and 
captured the policemen, who surrendered 
themselves and their weapons without a 
fight. All 677 of these prisoners, both Sin-
hala and Tamils, were taken to selected 
locations close by, forced to dig their own 
graves, and then brutally murdered in 
cold blood. 
At 1530 on that same day, 11 June, the 
army commander, the inspector general 
of police, a senior officer from the air 
force, and the director of army opera-
tions arrived at SLAF BCO by air. The 
senior superintendent of police BCO 
(who happened to be a Tamil), an assistant superinten-
dent of police who was stationed in Kallady Camp, and 
I were transported by helicopter from Kallady Camp to 
join the senior officials for an urgent conference. By the 
time I reached SLAF BCO, the policemen, their families, 
and the town’s Sinhala civilians, 150 to 200 in all, had 
gathered at the airport and were awaiting evacuation to 
Colombo. Getting through this crowd of emotionally 
devastated, angry, highly charged people was a trying task 
because their rage was directed at the Tamil senior police 
superintendent who followed immediately behind me. 
Fortunately, no incident took place. In the meeting, the 
group discussed the possibilities for reinforcing the police 
stations, but at the moment there was no way to do this 
because the army was already spread very thin—the army 
camps were under-manned and located too far apart to 
offer mutual support, and were themselves in great danger 
of attack. There was no artillery in the BCO district, and it 
would take one to two hours to fit the only available Bell 
212 helicopter with machine guns. We found ourselves in 
an extremely dangerous situation. The army leadership’s 
lack of preparation and the government’s abject appease-
ment of the LTTE could have led to the total loss of the 
Eastern Province.
The LTTE had launched attacks on the Kiran and Wella-
wadi Army Camps at 1630, while the meeting was taking 
place. At around 1800 that evening, after I had returned 
to Kallady Camp from SLAF BCO, the LTTE contacted 
me by telephone and told me to direct Kiran Camp to 
surrender in five minutes. If this order was disregarded, 
the insurgents were going to launch an all-out attack to 
take the camp. To buy more time and avoid being blamed 
for starting a war, I replied that I would inform the camp 
commanders of the rebels’ instructions after contacting Sri 
Lanka’s president.8
I immediately contacted my brigade commander in 
Ampara, but he responded evasively, 
reminding me of the presidential order 
to avoid fighting unless under attack. 
I then contacted the 2nd Division 
commander, Major General J.R.S. De 
Silva, at Anuradhapura. He insisted that 
the army should fight to the last man 
and the last round, and that the entire 
country was depending on our perfor-
mance in BCO. I requested immediate 
assistance from him to evacuate the 
camps at Wellawadi and Kalmunai, 
both of which had only depleted 
platoons to defend them.
By this time, three army camps in the BCO District—
Kiran, Wellawadi, and Kalawanchikudy—and Kalmunai 
Camp in the Ampara District were under continuous and 
severe attack. Wellawadi Camp had been established to 
protect a Sinhala fishing community of about 200 men, 
women, and children which had been in that area for 
generations. One group of 22 men led by 2/LT RMCC 
Ranaweera GW and supported by two 81mm mortars 
from the Kiran detachment fought for over 36 hours 
against more than 300 LTTE cadres with only 90 rounds 
of ammunition per soldier at hand. They received more 
ammunition by helicopter from Kallady on the morning 
of Tuesday, 12 June, and ultimately were able to protect the 
fisher families and evacuate them by sea that day with the 
assistance of a navy gunboat commanded by CDR Thisara 
Samarasinghe. The gunboat took the families and soldiers 
to safety at Trincomalee. The only civilian casualties of the 
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entire evacuation at Wellawadi were a mother and child who drowned while at-
tempting to board the naval craft. One soldier suffered a minor injury from LTTE 
fire during the entire 36-hour crisis.
The situation at Kalmunai was similar: the platoon under 2/LT KASH Karunatil-
lake SLLI came under intense fire from the LTTE starting on 11 June. On 13 June, 
a Sri Lankan Navy gunboat under the command of CDR Daya Dharmapriya, 
along with support vessels, evacuated the platoon after an agonizing battle, 
during which the soldiers and sailors were supported by artillery fire from the 
Malwatte Army Camp. The soldiers suffered several casualties from LTTE fire 
during the evacuation.
The Siege of Kiran Camp, 11–18 June
The siege of Kiran Camp, which also began on 11 June, lasted eight days. 
The LTTE unleashed salvos of mortar, small arms fire, and 84 mm rockets 
against the Kiran Camp, and on one occasion even used chlorine gas on the 
troops in the camp. The camp’s commanding officer, Captain Sumith Perera GW, 
and his second in command, Lieutenant Chinthaka Munasinghe GW, valiantly 
held the camp with less than 90 men against severe odds.9 Only one officer in 
that action, 2/LT Suminda Jayasundera GW, survived to the end of the war in 
2009. He had less than one year’s service with the battalion at the time of the 
siege. Private Dharmasiri K.A., the radio operator of A Company First GW, 
maintained communications with the battalion headquarters at Kallady and the 
rear HQ at Diyatalawa both day and night throughout the entire battle. When 
the antenna was damaged by intense mortar fire, Dharmasiri fixed it during the 
night by climbing the palmyra tree to which it was attached. 
On the night of 11 June, an Air Force helicopter fitted with machine guns 
arrived from the Batticaloa airbase to provide close air support to Kiran Camp. 
Flying Officer Thilana Kaluarachchi relentlessly and gallantly flew that entire 
night and continued to fly against the LTTE positions every night until the 
detachment was relieved. He kept the LTTE at bay and was a tremendous morale 
booster for the besieged troops.10 Ground-to-air communications were closely 
coordinated through CPL Gamini of First GW, who was stationed at the SLAF 
BCO base during the battle.
Rescue operations from several directions were finally launched on Friday, 15 
June, from northern BCO under the command of GOC 1 Division Major 
General D.L. Kobbekaduwa. On that same day, before the rescue began, 
Maj Gen Kobbekaduwa spoke with me over the radio. His voice was a 
great morale booster to me because at that point we were all desperate for 
our survival, and this was the first good news we had heard. Until then, 
the response to our requests for help from the military higher command 
had been negative at best, and we were given very little encouragement 
to continue fighting. As he described the pending rescue operations, the 
general’s voice had an air of confidence that inspired hope in us after four 
days of mental agony and battle stress.
The Third Brigade Group, commanded by Brigadier A.M.U. Seneviratne, 
provided artillery fire support to break the siege. The Fourth Battalion Ge-
munu Watch and the Fifth Battalion Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment had 
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to fight their way into BCO, which they reached by 19 June. Similarly, the 
First Brigade Group, commanded by Brigadier A.K. Jayawardhana, with 
the First Sinha Regiment and First Special Forces Regiment, fought their 
way from Ampara across country through Wellaveli to relieve the Kalwan-
chikudy detachment in southern BCO. Both brigade groups reached their 
objectives on 18 June despite heavy resistance from the LTTE.
On Saturday, 16 June, five days after the fighting began and as the relief 
operations began to put pressure on them, the LTTE requested a ceasefire 
through the bishop of Batticaloa so that both sides could attend to their 
respective casualties. The LTTE leaders, however, refused to disarm and re-
main in the SLAF BCO base, but wanted to accompany the bishop and me 
or my representative to Kiran. I rejected these terms, because it was clear to 
me that the LTTE intended to take us hostage and force the detachment to 
surrender by holding us at gunpoint. The LTTE repeatedly stooped to such 
deceit and proved their perfidy and treachery throughout the conflict. 
They continuously bombarded the troops on the base with pronouncements 
through a loud hailer, exhorting the soldiers to give up and surrender instead 
of fighting a losing battle. The troops responded by returning fire and fighting 
steadfastly and resolutely, denying the LTTE any opportunity to break into the 
camp.
The men in all the camps under siege survived on liquids, raw pawpaws, palmyra 
fruits, and the odd animal that strayed into camp during the siege. Such things 
were collected during the night or whenever there was a lull in the fighting. The 
well that supplied fresh water to the Kiran Camp was exposed to LTTE fire, so 
the men tunneled into it at night to get drinking water for their survival. 
The troops in Kiran survived for seven nights in trenches, with nothing 
but the uniforms on their backs, throughout relentless attacks by the LTTE. 
The alertness of the sentry enabled him to wipe out an entire group of nine 
LTTE guerrillas who were crawling into the camp one night after cutting the 
perimeter wire fence. Only one soldier was killed in action throughout the eight 
days of fighting, but one of three officers and 60 of 79 soldiers in the camp suf-
fered injuries and had to be evacuated when reinforcements finally arrived on 18 
June. One BBC correspondent refused to believe our low casualty count when he 
saw the area surrounding the camp, which was littered with more than 100 dead 
and decomposing bodies of LTTE fighters.
The success of the First GW troops in the defense of their camps in 
the BCO district was due to their courage, regimental esprit de corps, 
comradeship, belief in their leadership, and their steely determination to 
survive amid the death and wounding of their colleagues and the confu-
sion and chaos of battle. The men’s efforts to send the remains of the dead 
soldier, Sergeant Karunadasa E.A.D., which they had cremated at night 
with the help of palmyra branches amid LTTE small arms fire, to his next 
of kin were greatly appreciated by his parents and were a morale booster 
for the rest of the troops.
Conclusion
The Sri Lankan Armed Forces finally defeated the LTTE terrorists on 19 
May 2009 and restored Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity and sovereignty 
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after more than 27 years of bloody fighting. It is pertinent 
to remember all those who sacrificed their today for our 
tomorrow and the many Sri Lankans who suffered im-
measurable difficulty for almost 30 years. The single most 
important factor in developing the strength required to 
meet aggression is the attitude and will of our citizens. 
In the words of the Gemunu Watch motto: Tarry not 
forward!
Emboldened by their early 
successes and with outside sup-
port, the LTTE acquired a land 
force, a seaborne capability, and 
a nascent air force. The United 
States government designated 
the LTTE as a foreign terrorist 
organization in October 1997.11 
The insurgents’ innovative 
strategy of using suicide attacks 
against government forces 
and installations led the US 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
in 2008 to label them as the 
most ruthless terrorist organization in the world.12 Suicide 
attacks became a trademark tactic of the LTTE campaign. 
The Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense cites an LTTE declara-
tion that the insurgency was responsible for approximately 
378 suicide attacks on land and sea from July 1987 to May 
2009. This was one of the highest rates of such attacks in 
the world.13 Despite the fact that 32 countries have banned 
the LTTE from operating within their borders, the Tamil 
diaspora continues to support 
claims for a separate state 
and is pressuring the UN to 
prosecute Sri Lanka for alleged 
war crimes.
A strategic analysis of the Sri 
Lankan military victory must 
acknowledge the political will 
and leadership of President 
Mahinda Rajapaksa and his 
government (2005–2015). 
All security operations were 
coordinated in the National 
Security Council through Go-
tabaya Rajapaksa, the defense 
secretary and brother of the president. He ensured that all 
military commanders and the civilian bureaucracy cooper-
ated with each other and worked as a team to achieve final 
victory over the terrorists. The political leadership did not 
interfere with the operational commanders but gave them 
the freedom to conduct operations as the commanders 
thought necessary. Foreign and local media access to the 
operational areas was restricted, while the establishment 
of a Ministry of Defense website and a media center 
within the Ministry of National Security made it possible 
to counter the numerous LTTE propaganda and news 
websites and give Sri Lankan citizens and the world a more 
balanced view of the conflict. 
At the tactical level, the 
numerical strength of the 
security forces was doubled 
through new recruitment and 
enhanced by the procurement 
of vital armaments through 
China, Pakistan, Ukraine, the 
Czech Republic, and Israel. 
With this increase in strength, 
the SLAF took the offensive to 
the LTTE across many fronts, 
forcing them to react and 
lose the element of surprise in 
the battlefield. This relentless 
offensive, which lasted for nearly three years, never gave 
the terrorists an opportunity to recover and mount a 
counterstrike against the government forces. The increase 
in overall strength also allowed for better intelligence gath-
ering, which helped prevent numerous suicide bombing 
attempts by the LTTE in the south of Sri Lanka and the 
rear areas of the battlefield. The majority of the Sri Lankan 
people saw the tide turning in their favor after two decades 
of death and destruction, and 
supported the government 
with vital information and 
moral support, despite some 
international efforts to halt the 
offensive and resume negotia-
tions during the final months 
of the conflict.
It has been seven years since 
the defeat of the LTTE, and 
much has been achieved in the 
resettlement, reconstruction, 
and rehabilitation of the north 
and east. Rebuilding the lives 
of the victims of the conflict 
and finding reconciliation, however, will take decades, at 
the least. Some of the few Tamil politicians who remain 
continue to make political demands based on the aspira-
tions of LTTE ideology. Much of the moderate Tamil 
political leadership and the democratic parties and their 
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structures were destroyed by the LTTE. Grassroots Tamil political 
organizations were controlled by the LTTE, as were the judicial 
and policing functions in the regions they held. Although the Sri 
Lankan government maintained adequate stocks and facilities, and 
remunerated the Tamil civilian administration for the distribution 
of essential food, medical supplies, and educational materials during 
the conflict, these local administrations were controlled by the LTTE 
for over one and a half decades. They have now been rehabilitated 
with donor assistance, but much more has to be done in the coming 
years to meet the aspirations of the people in the north and east for 
a peaceful, productive future. 
The resettlement of internally displaced persons was hampered 
because large tracts of land were mined or strewn with unexploded 
ordnance and unmarked IEDs. Many other problems also interfered 
with post-conflict rehabilitation: disputes over land ownership; 
caste issues; dilapidated roads and poor access to remote areas; 
access to basic health and education facilities; the total destruction 
of the Northern railway line from Vavuniya up to Kankasanthurai 
on the northern coast; the destruction of public utilities including 
water, electricity, and transport; and the widespread damage and 
destruction of houses and other buildings due to the fighting. 
Almost all such facilities have been rehabilitated or rebuilt now with 
donor assistance, while the Sri Lankan Army has cleared about 75 to 
80 percent of the mines and IEDs in the north with donor assistance 
from the United States and Japan. In addition, India and seven 
NGOs have conducted de-mining operations in certain areas in the 
northeast independent of the Sri Lankan Army’s work.
The next important tasks for redevelopment will be to create em-
ployment and develop livelihoods for the Tamil populations in the 
north and east. These areas were dominated by agriculture, animal 
husbandry, and fisheries, and now, with many tourists coming back 
to Sri Lanka, there is great potential for the region’s development. 
Unfortunately, hardly any members of the Tamil diaspora have 
made substantial investments in the north, although some entre-
preneurs in the south have started garment and other factories that 
offer employment to Tamil youth from the north and east. This is 
a very encouraging sign and will help the process of reconciliation. 
There is more interaction among the people of all communities in 
Sri Lanka, and the mistrust created by years of conflict is slowly but 
surely receding. Therefore, it is imperative that the people of Sri 
Lanka are supported in their efforts to reconcile by the international 
community, so we all can live in peace and tranquility in an inde-
pendent, democratic, and united Sri Lanka.  ²
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IT IS THE SOLDIER
It is the Soldier, not the minister 
who has given us freedom of religion. 
It is the Soldier, not the reporter 
who has given us freedom of the press. 
It is the Soldier, not the poet 
who has given us freedom of speech. 
It is the Soldier, not the campus organizer  
Who has given us freedom to protest. 
It is the Soldier, not the lawyer 
who has given us the right to a fair trial. 
It is the Soldier, not the politician  
Who has given us the right to vote. 
It is the Soldier who salutes the flag,  
Who serves beneath the flag, 
Whose coffin is draped by the flag, 
Who allows the protestor to burn the flag.
Charles M. Province14
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1  Quoted in Dudley Gould, Follow Me Up Fool’s Mountain: Korea, 1951 (Middletown, Conn.: 
Southfarm Press, 2002), 51.
2  Bandaranaike was assassinated in 1959 by a man impersonating a Buddhist monk, and his 
widow, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, became the world’s first female prime minister in 1960.
3  Editor’s note: For more on the Sri Lankan civil war, see COL Sylvester Perera, “The Sri 
Lankan Civil War: A Personal Reminiscence,” CTX 5, no. 4 (November 2015): https://
globalecco.org/the-sri-lankan-civil-war-a-personal-reminiscence-col-sylvester-perera-sri-
lankan-army ; and LT Malaka Chandradasa, “Learning from Our Enemies: Sri Lankan Naval 
Special Warfare against the Sea Tigers,” CTX 2, no. 2 (May 2012): https://globalecco.org/
learning-from-our-enemies-sri-lankan-naval-special-warfare-against-the-sea-tigers
4 The proposed Tamil homeland, known as “Eelam,” comprised 28 percent of the land mass 
and 68 percent of the coastline of Sri Lanka, and encompassed 12 percent of the island’s 
Tamils. This population is now reduced to 6–8 percent because of overseas emigration and the 
dispersal of the majority across the rest of Sri Lanka.
5  I dedicate this article to all those valiant officers and men of the First Battalion, the Gemunu 
Watch, who served under my command from 1 December 1988 to 31 January 1991. They 
served with me loyally against all odds, and with dedication and commitment, in the 
Hambantota, Moneragala, Ampara, and Batticaloa districts. All without exception strove 
hard, and some made the supreme sacrifice, to protect the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. 
6 George Washington, “From George Washington to the United States Senate and House 
of Representatives, 8 January 1790,” n.d.: http://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Washington/05-04-02-0361
7 During this period, there was much turbulence in the infantry battalions as new units were 
being raised, existing battalions were reorganized, and new officers and men were distributed 
among them. Unit cohesion and the morale of the troops in combat initially suffered as a 
result.
8  The base commanders had been explicitly told by the president’s emissary, who was also the 
main spokesman for the government’s negotiating team, not to start another war, because 
the government didn’t have the funds to fight the LTTE and the president was confident of 
achieving peace through negotiations. This order meant that we couldn’t start firing, even 
if provoked, unless the insurgents fired first. This is, in fact, what happened, and we fought 
strongly to defend our base.
9  Both of these officers were killed in action in subsequent operations conducted against the 
LTTE—in Jaffna in 1995 and Mannar in 1991, respectively.
10 This officer was killed in 1997 when a missile hit the Mi-24 he was flying in over Kokilai 
Lagoon.
11 “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” Department of State, n.d.: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/
other/des/123085.htm
12 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Taming the Tamil Tigers: From Here in the US,” 10 January 
2008: https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008
13 Ministry of Defence, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, “Humanitarian Operation 
Factual Analysis: July 2006–May 2009,” July 2011: 22, para. 68: http://slembassyusa.org/
wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Sri-Lankan-Humanitarian-Operation-Factual-Analysis.pdf




The Lumads of the Philippines: Struggling 
from Conflict toward Peace
CDR Gilbert G. “Billy” Villareal, Jr., 
Philippine Navy
Lumad is a Filipino-Bisaya term meaning “native” or “indigenous,” 
and is the self-ascription and collective identity of the non-Islamized peoples 
who are said to be the original habitants of the island of Mindanao.1 The term is 
short for Katawhang Lumad (literally, “indigenous peoples”), the autonym of-
ficially adopted on 26 June 1986 by delegates to the Lumad Mindanaw People’s 
Federation (LMPF) founding assembly. The Lumad groups are a minority in the 
southern Philippines, distinct from the majority Moro Islam people of Mind-
anao. Not coincidentally, the places where the Lumads live are also the country’s 
last frontier in the hunt for natural resources. Because they have so far remained 
protected from mining and logging, the ancestral Lumad lands are said to have 
the highest mining potential of all the islands and include the last remaining 
uncut forests on Mindanao. Of the 23 priority mining projects under a 
government mining revitalization program in Mindanao, most lie within the 
ancestral lands of the Lumads. Aside from state-run mining and logging, and 
despite laws like the Indigenous People’s Rights Act, big plantations and big 
corporations still manage to encroach on this ancestral domain.
In September 2015, a tribal war erupted between the paramilitary group called 
Magahat-Bagani and the local Manobo tribe of the Lumads after the militia 
killed three tribal leaders. The Magahat-Bagani were formed as part of an anti-
communist/anti-insurgency drive being carried out by the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines, the continuation of a long struggle against insurgency beginning in 
the time of the anti-Japanese Hukbalahap Resistance in the occupied Philippines 
(1942–1954).2 In recent times, any Manobo who have complained about the be-
havior of the military and paramilitary troops are labeled as communist-terrorist 
sympathizers and targeted by these paramilitaries. There are plenty of allegations 
and misunderstandings from every side, including from the mining companies 
and local politicians. The Lumads, however, are the victims of these clashes: 
some 3,000 Lumads were displaced by the September 2015 incident after 
they fled from the Magahat-Bagan. The question is, who is to blame for the 
clashes: the military leadership, the communist-terrorist New People’s Army 
(NPA), local leaders, the mining companies, or the people who reacted with force 
without any clear understanding of the situation? Which side should the people 
of the Philippines support if we are to achieve any peace for the Lumads—peace 
that, so far, has been elusive? And what is the best way for the military to 
confront such a complicated problem?
Communist Exploitation
In the Philippines, indigenous people have seen the passage of laws protecting 
their rights, customs, and beliefs, including the economic, political, and cultural 
practices handed down by their ancestors from before the colonization of the 
Philippines by Spain in the sixteenth century. These laws are similar to the pro-
tections the United Nations and other international bodies have granted to in-
digenous people throughout the world. In the Philippines, there are government 
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agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have been supporting 
these rights and ensuring protection for people such as the Lumads. At the same 
time, however, some of these organizations have been manipulating indigenous 
groups, exploiting their vulnerabilities, and exerting social control. One such 
organization is the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army-
National Democratic Front, or CPP-NPA-NDF. This movement is composed of 
three branches: an ideological front (the CPP), an armed group (the NPA), and a 
legal-political wing (the NDF).3
The CPP and NDF have legal standing. Based on their ideology, practices, and 
political agenda, the Philippine government gave the party a seat in Congress, 
and their party lists for congressional seats have been accepted since the 1990s. 
But these three branches of the violent communist movement in the Philippines 
have shaped the ideas of scholars, students, poor people, and indigenous people 
like the Lumads. As a result, such people will often accept the communist ide-
ology and support their tactics, and frequently will join the communists’ armed 
struggle against government forces. 
By manipulating the political weakness and political innocence of these indig-
enous people of Mindanao through communist propaganda and the exploitation 
of legitimate grievances, the insurgents have led hundreds of Lumads to their 
deaths in clashes with security forces. Lumad villagers also serve as crowds during 
local communist rallies and have become a money-making tool for the commu-
nists, who encourage international organizations and other countries to support 
indigenous people’s rights, culture, and environmental preservation, but then 
uses various subterfuges to divert the donations to support its armed struggle. 
Communism as an ideology is not evil. Primitive, pre-Marxist-Leninist commu-
nism was something more like communalism—a social system whose structure, 
membership, and objectives are based on egalitarian relations within a group, 
common ownership, and a common goal. Such structures still exist in some 
indigenous hunter-gatherer communities, and the concept was revived in the 
West in the early to mid-twentieth century as communes of like-minded indi-
viduals. The Philippine CPP-NPA-NDF, however, are accused by some of manipu-
lating the beliefs and ideology of the Lumads and some members of the NGOs 
that are working to preserve indigenous culture and tradition. Communists are 
suspected of infiltrating certain NGOs to influence the organizations’ work with 
the Lumads and make it easier to recruit indigenous supporters and incite them 
against the government. The insurgents exploit the Philippine government’s 
weaknesses, such as failing to provide basic services to the people in those areas 
or to protect the land from illegal resource extraction by private mining and 
logging companies. The Lumads seem to be caught between the two opposing 
forces: if they cooperate with the insurgents against mining or logging operators, 
government forces might respond by intensifying military operations that could 
damage Lumad lives and homes. Those Lumads who support the government 
risk harassment or attack by NPA supporters, and their leaders risk assassination. 
In this atmosphere of fear and violence, NPA groups also extort Lumad commu-
nities and local companies, including mining, farm, and logging businesses, and 
even small-scale stores in rural areas, to pay a so-called revolutionary tax, which 
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The Philippine Army has created irregular security forces among the Lumad 
groups to help secure the indigenous communities. These irregulars, called Cit-
izen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGUs), are usually trained and armed 
by the Army as an auxiliary force and paid a subsistence allowance. A regular 
cadre typically is assigned to each CAFGU unit. Some members of the Magahat-
Bagani paramilitary groups, mentioned earlier, are also CAFGUs. This project 
has had both positive and negative outcomes. On the positive side, the Lumad 
CAFGUs were given training and arms to enable them to secure their community 
and their communal lands. When big companies started to invest near Lumad 
lands or bought out sacred grounds, the indigenous people were given jobs in 
mining, logging, farming, and other fields and opportunities for economic prog-
ress. Some CAFGU Lumads and army personnel stationed in the Lumad region 
receive a salary or “allowance” from these private and international companies 
to provide security (although it is unlawful for military personnel to do so). The 
money becomes a much-needed potential source of economic progress for some 
Lumads and their communities, some of which have become assimilated into 
this new type of partnership. Some Lumad CAFGU members have become local 
police and community leaders, working to secure their communities from threats 
and even act as judges in simple disputes. Others help the military hunt rebels. 
On the negative side, although these activities have helped build mutual trust 
between some members of the military and some Lumad communities, this kind 
of selective cooperation has also created rifts between indigenous communities 
and groups, a problem further exacerbated by the uneven distribution of funds 
from the military and the private companies. These are circumstances that the 
communists have exploited to win local support. A Lumad community that has a 
good relationship with the mining companies and the government and is making 
some economic progress will arm itself against other Lumad communities that 
have been alienated by neglect and therefore support the communists’ armed 
struggle. This becomes a cycle of violence between the security forces, the 
NPA, and the Lumads, which the government needs to address not only by 
military intervention, but through government services like education, jobs, 
roads, housing, and social and health services.
Local politicians and the Philippine government are known to give permits 
to big international and local companies that are taking the Lumads’ natural 
resources without permission from the indigenous communities.4 This has been 
the case for as long as the government and the military have been involved with 
the Lumads. As a result, the Lumad groups’ loyalties are divided between the 
government and the communists, and the legitimacy of the government in many 
indigenous areas has diminished. Some Lumad leaders have started to speak 
up for their communities, however, noting that historically, Lumads have been 
perfectly able to handle their own communities and ancestral lands according to 
their own culture, beliefs, and ancestral practices and laws.5 
Since 2013, the military’s strategy in Mindanao has been more effective in 
helping empower the local communities, by starting a broad, community-based 
peace struggle rather than simply confronting the armed component of the 
rebels in battle.6 This strategy involves enabling all local government agencies to 
provide basic services, especially to the communities of the Lumads. Unfortu-
nately, due to financial constraints and the community divisions described here, 
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annual aid targets have not always been met, a circum-
stance the communist rebels have taken advantage of with 
increased propaganda, recruitment, and fighting. The 
result has been even greater confusion among the Lumad 
communities.
In October 2015, Lumad leaders stood up to both the NPA 
and the Philippine government by making it clear that 
they did not want to be exploited by anybody. Lumad ac-
tivists posted films on YouTube that showed how Lumad 
youth and the education system have been influenced by 
communist rebel propaganda, and how young Lumads are 
being influenced to participate in the communists’ armed 
struggle. At the same time, the CPP took loyal Lumad sup-
porters to Manila to expose extrajudicial killings and pro-
test the military and the government’s counterterrorism 
efforts. Such events highlight the Lumads’ intention to 
stop both the NPA and the government from exploiting 
indigenous people and dragging them into conflict, and 
to force both sides to respect their human rights and 
ancestral domain. These events con-
tinued for several weeks, during which 
local Philippine news sources exposed 
the stories of the indigenous people’s 
struggles and their manipulation by 
both the communists and the govern-
ment. After several days of this public 
exposure, Dario Otaza, a Lumad official 
who had been fighting against commu-
nist exploitation, was assassinated by the 
NPA.7 The investigation is ongoing, and 
warrants have been issued to capture the 
NPA members believed to be responsible 
for the assassination.
Conclusion 
The Lumads have a great number of followers, including 
independent organizations, scholars, religious groups, and 
government agencies, which respect indigenous people’s 
rights and have shown support for the principle, “Leave 
them alone.” Some key Lumad leaders are renewing 
the call to respect their rights as indigenous people of 
Mindanao. They describe how tired they are of conflicts 
in which the strategy of “divide and rule” is used against 
them, not only by the military and the NPA but also by 
miners and local politicians. These leaders say the Lumads 
are being treated as give-aways by these powerful forces 
and have always been used as propaganda for others’ 
self-advancement.8 Although the military has played 
a large role in empowering the Lumads to oppose the 
communist rebels in recent times, the stigma of the 
time when both the military and government officials 
exploited the ancestral communities, lands, and natural 
resources of the Lumads still lingers. But the Lumads in 
Mindanao generally recognize that the Philippine military 
has changed to a professional institution in recent years. 
The government’s strategy for peace and development has 
empowered the local people to reject the NPA insurgency 
and oppose its influence.  
The Philippine government has the duty to uphold the 
rule of law equally for all citizens, especially if it hopes to 
have their support against the violent communist insur-
gency. The government’s legitimacy should be reinforced 
in all parts of the Philippines, including within the 
Lumads’ ancestral lands, not only by the security forces 
but also by all local government agencies concerned with 
providing government services. The Lumad communities 
must be empowered not only with military training and 
arms but also with sufficient social services, including 
education, jobs, roads, and basic infrastructure to support 
their communities and tribes. For their 
part, the security forces—both military 
and police—and local politicians must 
avoid the culture of bribes and per-
sonal advantages that lead to unequal 
treatment for the indigenous people, 
including the exploitation of their lands 
and natural resources.
This has been a long fight for the 
Lumads, but the fate of their long 
struggle for peace remains in doubt. 
The Philippine government, the law 
enforcement agencies, the military, and the local govern-
ment—especially indigenous leaders—must unite in their 
efforts to shape and deliver peace for the Lumads. The 
Lumads of Mindanao are a great treasure of the Philippines 
and deserve every effort to preserve their culture and com-
munities. Sometimes all of us become greedy—we forget 
the past and the people to whom we owe our origins. We 
should reflect on the words of anthropologists and envi-
ronmentalists, who caution that indigenous people like 
the Lumads should be left untouched and unexploited by 
the greed of the outside world.  ²
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Assessing Canada’s Integrated National 
Security Enforcement Teams: Can the 
Concept of INSETs Be Exported?
Michael Tierney,  
University of Waterloo
After the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, sev-
eral countries adjusted their counterterrorism and national security policies to 
better protect themselves against terrorist threats. The Canadian government 
took a proactive approach to counterterrorism by studying the United States’ 9/11 
Commission report, which found that barriers to communication and coopera-
tion between various security and intelligence agencies had made it easier for 
al Qaeda to conduct an attack on US soil.1 The assessment led to Canada’s first 
official national security policy, which set expectations for law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies to work together more closely to share information, conduct 
investigations, and prevent terrorism, both within Canada’s borders and abroad.2 
In addition to encouraging security agencies to collaborate more closely than 
they had done prior to 9/11, the Government of Canada also set out specific 
provisions for countering terrorism. In particular, in 2002, the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) was given the primary responsibility for counterter-
rorism in Canada’s post-9/11 security environment and was instructed to set up 
Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) in various strategic 
sites across Canada. These new teams included Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) agents, Canadian Border Services Agency members, local law 
enforcement personnel, and other security-related officials. The INSETs allowed 
the RCMP to engage in intelligence-led policing by making it possible for all 
participants to provide information about threats to Canada to RCMP counter-
terrorism officers on an ongoing basis.3
The approach was not unlike those taken by the United States and the United 
Kingdom after 2001. The US government set up counterterrorism “Fusion 
Centers” following 9/11 to integrate law enforcement and intelligence services, 
while the United Kingdom created “Integrated Security Units” to operate in 
a similar fashion.4 In Canada, however, the situation was somewhat unique 
because the RCMP and the CSIS, arguably the two biggest INSETs partners, had 
shared a tumultuous history since the creation of CSIS in 1984. The CSIS was 
created from the RCMP’s Security Service, which was responsible for intelligence 
and national security investigations in Canada prior to 1984. RCMP officers 
were moved to the new intelligence service amid disagreements about whether 
national security investigations should be conducted by law enforcement or a 
civilian agency, prompting resentment among former colleagues. An agency turf 
war resulted, and the inability of the two services to work together left Canada 
more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.5 These negative consequences came to light 
with the bombing of Air India flight 182 on 23 June 1985 by the Sikh terrorist 
group Babbar Khalsa.6 A subsequent inquiry into the bombing led to assertions 
that a better working relationship between the RCMP and the CSIS could have 
prevented the attack.7 Therefore, with the creation of the INSETs, the two Cana-
dian services most responsible for combating terrorism had to overcome their 
past conflicts and find a way to work together very closely, as well as alongside 
new partners such as local law enforcement agencies. 
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The purpose of this article is to assess the integrated security model in Canada, 
and to determine whether this approach can be applied in other jurisdictions 
and how to implement it. There are several issues that have facilitated or pre-
vented close collaboration between Canadian security agencies, and can provide 
useful insights for successful security integration in Canada and across the globe. 
Canada’s Counterterrorism Efforts since 9/11
Canada made significant changes to the structure and operations of its security 
and intelligence community soon after 9/11 with passage of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act and the development of a formal national security policy, both of which 
were later augmented by an official counterterrorism strategy. Under the Liberal 
government of the day, an initial $7.8 billion was earmarked over five years for 
national security (all dollar amounts in this article are in Canadian dollars).8 In 
the eight years following 9/11, the government allocated $1.6 billion for intel-
ligence and policing and gave nearly $600 million to the RCMP for counterter-
rorism efforts.9 With these budget increases, the RCMP set up INSETs in four 
major cities across Canada: Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, and Ottawa. These 
units were responsible for national security investigations in Ontario, Quebec, 
British Columbia, and the national capital region, respectively.10 Members of 
Canada’s various security institutions were required to work together on issues 
of counterterrorism within these INSET offices and to share information more 
widely than they had prior to 9/11.11 These agencies were also housed under a 
new federal department, Public Safety Canada, which had assumed the role of its 
predecessor, the Office of the Solicitor General.12 Unlike the post-9/11 changes 
to the United States’ national security policies, however, these organizational 
and policy changes to the relationship between intelligence and law enforcement 
did not lead to a massive increase in the size of Canada’s security bureaucracies.13 
As security analyst Kostas Rimsa notes, the Government of Canada “reorganized 
existing resources, only hiring a very few new staff at the lowest levels.”14  
Still, Canada’s security institutions had been revitalized following the budget 
balancing and spending cuts of the 1990s. While the responsibilities of agencies 
such as the CSIS remained relatively the same, the RCMP was given new powers 
to combat terrorism, including preventive arrest and an increased role in intel-
ligence gathering.15 As a result, the gap between intelligence and policing, which 
was seen as a major obstacle to preventing the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United 
States, was greatly diminished. Police officers gained access to security intel-
ligence information that had typically been used only for discovering security 
threats.16 
INSETs are based on the premise of intelligence-led policing, in which police 
use intelligence to make arrests before an incident occurs.17 The RCMP is the 
lead agency in Canada’s integrated security units, while several other agencies 
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provide information to the Mounties as necessary.18 Conversely, the RCMP can 
provide INSET partners with operational support as needed.19 The close col-
laboration between various organizations with distinct responsibilities creates 
a delicate balance between intelligence and policing in Canada. In deference to 
the tumultuous past relations between these services, the federal government 
instituted a joint management team at the outset to increase cooperation and 
decrease interagency conflict.20 In 2004, two years after the implementation of 
INSETs, 285 members of the RCMP were engaged in the four INSET units located 
across the country.21 Since that time, the Government of Canada has set up one 
more security unit in the province of Alberta, with 32 officers.22 It is unclear 
exactly how many officers from the RCMP or agents from other services are cur-
rently engaged in INSETs, but the new partnership between the various national 
security agencies represents a fairly distinct shift in counterterrorism efforts in 
Canada when compared to pre-9/11 arrangements.  
More recently, Bill C-51 was enacted in June 2015 to further support the integra-
tion of law enforcement and intelligence agencies in Canada. The legislation 
gives police increased powers of preventive arrest and intelligence agencies the 
ability to play a more proactive role in the disruption of terrorist activities.23 For 
instance, police officers can now make an arrest if they believe someone may 
conduct a terrorist act. Prior to C-51, officers could make arrests only if an indi-
vidual clearly intended to commit a terrorist act.24 While the Criminal Code’s 
wording was only slightly changed, police officers have greater responsibility to 
decide whether a suspect is involved in terrorism, while the threshold for making 
an arrest has decreased. Furthermore, there are a greater number of departments 
and agencies now involved in information-sharing, which had previously been 
limited to specific services such as the RCMP or the CSIS.25   
These new measures have certainly not been without controversy. Citizens have 
raised concerns about privacy rights, individual freedoms, and oversight for the 
intelligence services, all of which may be impinged upon by new “disruptive” 
capabilities.26 It is worth noting that Canadian courts have historically set the 
burden of proof quite high for such cases, and law enforcement officials have 
been hesitant to use the power of preventive arrest in the past.27 Since C-51 was 
enacted, police officers have also turned increasingly towards the use of “peace 
bonds,” which restrict an individual’s movements and activities without placing 
them under arrest. To obtain a peace bond, police must present evidence before a 
judge that a suspect is liable to commit a terrorism offense.28 Therefore, meeting a 
legal burden of proof is still the norm, even if the threshold for preventive arrest 
has been lowered. Finally, the recently-elected Liberal government has promised 
more oversight for the security services with their enhanced capabilities. In 
this manner, the government has paid recent attention to ensuring that the 
new “disruptive” measures are not unduly impacting civil rights.29 Nonetheless, 
Canada’s federal government also announced, in April 2015, that it was going to 
CANADIAN COURTS 
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increase security spending by about $293 million over five years.30 According to 
the announcement, the budget increases are meant to aid INSET partners as they 
work to protect national security.31
Case Studies
Two specific cases involving INSETs, discussed below, demonstrate whether and 
how the institutions have been successful in countering terrorism since 2001.
The Arar Affair
Soon after the implementation of INSETs, Canadian security agencies began 
working closely together, sharing information that would help them successfully 
combat terrorism both at home and abroad. However, they quickly discovered 
the inherent risks of an integrated security approach. In 2002, an engineer with 
dual Syrian-Canadian citizenship named Maher Arar was stopped by US officials 
at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City. Using informa-
tion passed along by the RCMP, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officers 
detained Arar for questioning about his alleged connections to al Qaeda and his 
involvement in terrorism-related activities.32 It is worth noting that the RCMP 
officials responsible for passing the intelligence on Arar to the FBI had originally 
been given the information by CSIS agents, who are a main partner in the INSET 
arrangement.33 Despite there being no evidence that Arar was knowingly associ-
ated with al Qaeda in any way, RCMP officials treated information that he was 
involved in terrorism-related activities as fact because of his acquaintance with 
individuals such as Abdullah Almalki, 
who was associated with the Ahmed 
Khadr family, some of whose members 
were linked to Osama bin Laden.34  
In this case, concerns about the 
intelligence-sharing process centered 
on the fact that security intelligence 
had been passed along to the RCMP, 
which, in essence, used the informa-
tion as evidence to designate Arar as a 
terrorist without empirical corrobora-
tion. Arar was subsequently deported 
to Syria, where he was imprisoned and 
tortured for over a year until the Syrian 
government gave up its efforts to find 
a link between him and any terrorist 
organization.35 He was finally released 
to Canadian consular authorities in 
October 2003. Instead of presenting 
the intelligence information from the 
CSIS as evidence of guilt, it would have 
been feasible for Canadian authorities 
to designate Arar as a person of in-
terest due to his apparent relationships 
with jihadists and keep him under 
MAHER ARAR WAS 
DEPORTED TO SYRIA, 







surveillance. Instead, his case made clear that the integrated security approach 
had flaws that needed to be remedied.
In the ensuing official inquiry into Arar’s case, Justice Dennis O’Connor found 
that there was no reason to suggest that Maher Arar was involved in terrorist 
activities and also that the RCMP had supplied US authorities with inaccurate 
information that was probably the deciding factor in the deportation of Arar.36 
In his final report and recommendations on the case, O’Connor’s main con-
cerns had to do with role definitions, accountability, and external review, along 
with training and communications within and among the security services.37 
Intelligence should be used to “see patterns and understand the general picture 
about a specific group or activity.”38 This is why the job of the CSIS is to collect 
and analyze information and report to the government: intelligence collection 
is not the same as acquiring evidence to make arrests or lay charges.39 Justice 
O’Connor’s report stressed that INSET partners should stay within their man-
dates, communicate effectively, and respect each other’s areas of responsibility 
when working together.40 
The Arar case and O’Connor’s report shifted the INSET arrangement into a new 
era, with new rules in place to prevent misuse or abuses from recurring. The 
RCMP and the CSIS signed a renewed memorandum of understanding in 2006 
that delineated each agency’s role when conducting counterterrorism investiga-
tions and during other joint initiatives.41 The Canadian Association of Chiefs of 
Police also adopted a Common Framework for National Security, which out-
lined the distinct roles of police forces like the RCMP and security agencies like 
the CSIS in national security operations.42 Finally, the RCMP began to configure 
its National Security Criminal Investigation Program’s Tactical Priorities using 
the CSIS’s National Strategic Priorities to better respect the intelligence service’s 
role in Canadian security.43 This new level of coordination and cooperation was 
reflected in the Toronto 18 terrorist case, described below.
The Toronto 18
In 2006, 18 men from Ontario planned to bomb the Toronto Stock Exchange, 
the CSIS’s Toronto offices, and a 
military base along Highway 401, a 
major roadway in Ontario.44 Before 
the attacks could occur, however, 
two members of the group that came 
to be known as the “Toronto 18” 
notified CSIS agents about the plot. 
Mubin Shaikh and Shaher Elsohemy 
had infiltrated the cell on behalf of 
the Canadian spy agency and trained 
at the group’s camp near Orillia, 
Ontario.45 After concluding that the 
cell was in fact involved in criminal 
terrorist activity, the CSIS passed the 
two informants along to the RCMP, 
which ran a separate investigation.46   
18 MEN PLANNED TO 
BOMB THE TORONTO 
STOCK EXCHANGE, 
CSIS OFFICES, AND 
A MILITARY BASE.
Entrance to an alleged terrorist training camp in Washago, north of Toronto
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A man by the name of Zakaria Amara was one of the leaders of 
the Toronto 18 terrorist cell. After the CSIS passed its informa-
tion to the RCMP, officers entered his apartment on a legal 
warrant, where they found evidence including detonators, 
instructions about how to mix deadly chemicals, and videos on 
bomb activation.47 CSIS agents had previously entered Amara’s 
apartment in a covert operation and were able to lead the police 
in their search.48 The Mounties were also able to use wiretaps 
and electronic surveillance to record Toronto 18 members dis-
cussing potential attacks on Canadian soil and their motives for 
executing such attacks.49 In the end, the attacks were prevented, 
members of the group were charged under the Anti-Terrorism 
Act, and several conspirators received prison sentences through 
the criminal justice system.50
More than 200 RCMP officers conducted surveillance on the 
targets in conjunction with their INSET partners.51 While the CSIS’s findings 
would be inadmissible in court because they dealt with sensitive national 
security issues, the RCMP collected evidence that would ensure that members 
of the Canadian terrorist cell would be brought to justice.52 Project Osage, the 
code name given to the joint surveillance operation, can be considered one of 
the most successful outcomes of the integrated security model to date. 
Taking the INSET Model into the Future
The Canadian integrated security approach has resulted in both positive and 
negative outcomes since its inception in 2001. As the CSIS has noted, the 
Toronto 18 case proved that police and intelligence agencies can work together 
to “achieve a common goal while not diluting or overstepping their respective 
legislative mandates.”53 The “separate but parallel” investigation system developed 
within the INSET model and successfully implemented during the Toronto 18 
case is a key factor in sustaining the integrated security approach. Agencies 
responsible for national security in Canada have been able to maintain separate 
investigations while occasionally sharing information, which has allowed them 
to work together more seamlessly to fulfill their mutual goals and preserve their 
independent mandates.54 After the Toronto 18 investigation, the CSIS planned to 
continue improving its relationship with the RCMP.55 In one of its latest public 
reports, the CSIS stated that it has continued to work toward this objective by 
developing a series of protocols for information sharing with the RCMP.56 The 
two services have also sought guidance from the Department of Justice and 
the Public Prosecution Service to interpret a growing body of jurisprudence on 
joint operations, which will help them further ensure that they can safeguard 
national security while respecting legal boundaries.57 More recent investigations 
conducted by INSETs, such as the Via Rail plot to attack a passenger train in 
2013, seem to indicate that the agencies have remained committed to the goal 
of observing their respective mandates while conducting joint investigations to 
achieve successful outcomes.58 
In response to the O’Connor inquiry, Canadian INSET partners implemented 
new policies and procedures to decrease the chances of another negative out-
come, while strengthening their ability to protect Canadian security. To inves-
tigate the Toronto 18 case, agencies such as the RCMP, the CSIS, and local law 









enforcement were able to draw on well-trained personnel 
who shared information and pooled resources in a precise, 
effective, and responsible manner. The agencies markedly 
improved their communications with each other, fully 
respected their partners’ roles, and worked together to 
achieve common objectives during the investigation. 
These measures allowed INSET partners to collaborate 
more successfully than they had during the Arar affair. 
The agencies also demonstrated that they were able to 
overcome the long-standing differences that had troubled 
them prior to 9/11.  
Conversely, it is evident from the Arar affair that any 
government attempting to closely integrate its security 
agencies must ensure that all of the partners involved have 
clearly demarcated roles, understand and respect each 
other’s responsibilities, and have appropriate account-
ability structures in place to deter the improper sharing of 
information. Furthermore, it is imperative that personnel 
assigned to integrated security units receive proper 
training and understand how to effectively communicate 
with officials from other agencies. This 
will help them to avoid duplication of 
efforts and ensure that any informa-
tion shared includes stipulations 
regarding the user’s intentions and the 
information’s degree of accuracy. Such 
measures will help any country that 
is considering the integrated security 
model to avoid problems such as those 
that occurred in the Arar case.
Outside of specific cases however, 
obstacles remain with regard to security 
integration in Canada. Of particular concern are the very 
different natures of intelligence and law enforcement. 
In essence, the imperative of the CSIS is long-term intel-
ligence gathering, so that policy makers may understand 
and address future threats to national security. Yet the 
RCMP is driven by the need to prevent crimes in the short 
term.59 While these responsibilities are not necessarily mu-
tually exclusive, the divergence in organizational cultures 
creates a barrier for the close collaboration of intelligence 
agencies and police services. It is worth noting that the 
CSIS and the RCMP have experienced some tensions in 
recent years, especially with regard to resource allocation, 
how information is shared between partners, and how 
new mandates under C-51 might affect each agency’s 
existing relationships with other security agencies.60 Due 
to their tumultuous history, there are avenues available 
for these particular agencies to overcome their cultural 
differences. States that are looking at implementing an 
integrated security model, however, must be aware of 
similar issues as they rethink their own national security 
policies.       
Further consideration must also be given to the issue of 
oversight for integrated security services. Traditionally, 
security services have their own accountability mecha-
nisms, but the integrated security model likely requires an 
integrated oversight mechanism as well. When they do 
implement this kind of accountability structure, agencies 
are actually more prone to sharing information because 
they feel less concern about how the information will be 
used by the partner agency.61 An enhanced accountability 
mechanism also helps to alleviate public concerns about 
the possible infringement of civil rights.62 Notably, the 
Government of Canada has recently announced that it 
will review national security oversight in an attempt to ad-
dress the lack of an integrated accountability mechanism 
for INSET partners. In the same way, other countries that 
plan to shift from traditional security approaches to the 
INSET model should review their oversight mechanisms 
to ensure effective collaboration and 
successful operations between security 
partners.  
The auditor general of Canada has 
found further problems with the INSET 
partners’ ability to work together due to 
technology constraints and personnel 
decisions. Specifically, INSET partners 
have had to work together without 
adequate computer systems in place 
to share database information, despite 
the fact that one of the central goals of 
the INSETs is better data-sharing.63 Another concern is 
whether the agencies have sufficient resources and subject 
matter experts in place to fully address threats to national 
security, conduct investigations, and collaborate with 
partner agencies.64 While it would seem that government 
and top security officials have attempted to address some 
of these issues in recent years, especially with regards to 
computer systems and personnel distribution, it is impor-
tant that sufficient resources are allocated to give INSETs 
the best opportunity to achieve their central objectives.65  
Conclusion
While Canada’s INSETs undoubtedly have room for im-
provement, experience so far suggests that the model can 
be applied across various jurisdictions if the appropriate 
measures are established for security services to work 
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THE CTAP INTERVIEW
Brian Fishman, Center for International 
Security and Cooperation
Interviewed by Dr. Douglas Borer, 
US Naval Postgraduate School
This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating 
Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP).1 On 20 August 2015, Dr. Doug Borer 
sat down with Brian Fishman to discuss the history and strategies of al Qaeda 
and ISIS, and what makes them different. Mr. Fishman previously served as the 
research director at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and was a 
founding editor of the CTC Sentinel. He is presently a fellow in the Interna-
tional Studies program at New America and at Stanford University’s Center for 
International Security and Cooperation.2
DOUGLAS BORER: A lot of people don’t understand how ISIS seemed to pop out 
of the sand, if you will, and take over parts of the Middle East so rapidly. Can 
you help us understand the group’s background?
BRIAN FISHMAN: This group’s roots go back to organizations in Jordan in 
the mid-1990s, which were led by Abu Musab al Zarqawi. Zarqawi, who was 
the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, was released from prison in 1999. He moved 
to Afghanistan, where he was able to interact with al Qaeda, and ended up 
establishing a camp in the western Afghanistan city of Herat. This camp 
included mostly people from the Levant: Jordanians, Palestinians, Lebanese, 
and Syrians. This is a population that al Qaeda traditionally had a difficult time 
recruiting among—there weren’t a lot of senior al Qaeda leaders from that part 
of the world. So Zarqawi set up this camp, which he called Jund al-Sham, or the 
“Soldiers of the Levant.” Obviously, after 9/11 and the US attack on Afghani-
stan, Zarqawi ended up in Iraq. 
He eventually united with al Qaeda, but he already had this network of people 
that stretched from Iraq into Lebanon, among the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, 
and across Syria. This organization established al Qaeda in Iraq, which was, of 
course, one of the main insurgent groups fighting the US and coalition presence 
there. But what’s really critical to the story of ISIS is that throughout that early, 
pre-9/11 period, Zarqawi talked a lot about building an Islamic state in Iraq and 
in Syria. That’s one of the interesting things: even in those early days, he and his 
followers saw a demographic opportunity in Syria, which had a primarily Sunni 
population led by a government dominated by Alawites, a form of Shi’ism. 
Zarqawi was killed in June 2006 in a US airstrike, and in October his successors 
declared something called the Islamic State of Iraq. The US government, for the 
most part, believed this declaration was merely a sort of window dressing—a 
rebranding of al Qaeda in Iraq. In the United States, the organization was still 
called al Qaeda in Iraq for another five years, until the Syrian civil war broke out, 
despite the fact that it had formally changed its name, and despite the fact that 
in 2007 al Qaeda’s leadership said there was no more al Qaeda in Iraq—there 
was only the Islamic State of Iraq. So there are a lot of reasons to think that even 
al Qaeda’s leadership was buying into this rebranding. 










But what’s important about that is that the people who 
are part of ISIS today believe their history is almost 10 
years long—that they have been at this project of building 
a state for 10 years. They believe that they have sustained 
their organization and continued to fight despite the 
surge of US troops into Iraq from 2007 
to 2009, despite the “awakening” of 
Sunni tribal leaders against the Islamic 
State of Iraq. So today ISIS’s leaders say, 
“Look at what we have beaten. We have 
beaten the best the Americans can throw 
at us, and we have sustained ourselves, 
and we have remained through that 
time.” They draw a lot of strength from 
this notion of their history. 
I think they really did intend to build a state in 2006. But 
even if you disagree with that point, and I think smart 
people can reasonably disagree with it, it’s important 
to grasp how ISIS 
understands its own 
history. When we 




think about what 
it means to defeat 
them, we have to 
understand their 
sense of identity, 
which is wrapped 
up in this history 
going back at least 
to 2006. 
The original set 
of leaders who 
founded the Islamic 
State of Iraq was 
killed in 2010. 
That’s a period, I 
think, when many 
in the United States 
believed that the 
group was basically 
defeated. That was 
wrong. This was an 
organization that 
had, by US govern-
ment estimates, 
maybe 800 to 1,000 
people straddling the border between Syria and Iraq, even 
on the eve of the Syrian civil war. That was a major decline 
from its earlier peak of about 12,000. The Islamic State 
of Iraq may not have looked like a state at that moment, 
in 2010 to 2011, but 800 to 1,000 people is still a really 
big terrorist group by any measure. Al 
Qaeda on 9/11 had maybe 200 people 
in it. So when those of us who had 
watched the Islamic State of Iraq for a 
long time started to see the unrest in 
Syria, both political unrest and then 
early hints of violence, it was pretty 
clear that the Islamic State of Iraq was 
well-positioned to take advantage of 
that. The leaders certainly thought they 
had a demographic advantage in Syria 
that they didn’t have in Iraq, because Iraq is a primarily 
Shi’a country and Syria is a primarily Sunni country. 
Therefore, I think 
this notion of 
history is really 
important. I think 
ISIS’s leaders will 
keep going back 
to that history for 
inspiration, espe-
cially when they get 
pressured. We can 
do a lot of damage 
to this organization 
with military force. 
We could do more 
aggressive things 
than we are doing, 
and I think we could 
hurt them badly. 
But their sense of 
identity is tied to 
the idea that they 
can withstand 
those blows. They 
say to themselves, 
“We know we can, 
because we have 
done it before.” 
When we think 
about how we are 
going to defeat this 
organization and its 
fighters, their belief 
in themselves raises 
A woman walks under a huge anti-terror advertisement showing the image of fire 
and the portrait of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (2005).
ISIS’S LEADERS HAVE 
THIS MYTHOLOGY 
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the level of difficulty because we not only 
have to defeat them militarily, but we 
have to find ways to crush their spirit as 
well. They built an ideology—not just 
an ideology, but a legend, the mythology 
of their history—that I think will help 
sustain them in those hard times. 
I suspect those hard times are coming for 
ISIS in the next couple of years. I don’t 
think it can remain as powerful as it is 
today, but neither do I think it will be 
defeated easily, because its leaders have 
this mythology that makes them resilient 
and regenerative. 
BORER: I would like to go back to this al Qaeda connection. Is separating the 
two groups a distinction without a difference? Are al Qaeda and the Islamic 
State essentially the same thing, or are there ways to distinguish between 
them? 
FISHMAN: I think they come from two different sources. The way this often is 
described is that al Qaeda is a group of intellectuals, while ISIS grew from the 
bottom up. Zarqawi, the mafia-style “godfather” of ISIS, is often characterized as 
a kind of street thug, whereas Osama bin Laden was an educated man. Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, the current emir of al Qaeda, is a doctor, so also very educated. 
I tend to think this distinction isn’t that important, however. The way I see the 
difference between these organizations in broad terms is that al Qaeda had a 
pretty big ideological tent for a jihadi group. It said, “You don’t have to agree 
with us on everything. But we want to help you work with other militant 
organizations. We want to help you overthrow governments that are unjust.” In 
other words, “We want to help you attack the United States. We want to help 
you overthrow the Saudi monarchy.” Al Qaeda built relationships with lots of 
different organizations to achieve those things, without getting hung up on the 
specifics of doctrine. Its goal was to collaborate with others. 
But it was also fundamentally an elite organization. It wasn’t an accident that al 
Qaeda only had around 200 members on 9/11. The organization was designed to 
be small. It was supposed to be elite. Its members thought of themselves as sort 
of special operators in the jihadi world, who would train, advise, and assist other 
jihadi organizations. That was the mission. And then they had their own special 
operations, including 9/11. So that was al Qaeda’s operating model: big ideology, 
willing to work with anybody, but a small elite organization. 
ISIS turned that around, saying, “Our ideology is more restrictive. We are not 
going to work with people who don’t agree with us on everything.” In practice, 
they do build political alliances. But ISIS’s ideology is much more restrictive in 
terms of the people it will tolerate. And that means it is much more willing to 
declare other Muslims takfir—non-Muslims—than al Qaeda is. Al Qaeda was 
willing to do that, too, but had different ways of going about it, and the differ-
ences are really important. 
Saudi Emir of Medina Faisal bin 
Salman bin Abdulaziz (right) and 
security officers look at blood stains 
after a suicide attack outside one 
of Islam’s holiest sites, the Prophet’s 
Mosque in Medina, on 4 July 2016.
ISIS IS MUCH MORE 
WILLING TO DECLARE 
OTHER MUSLIMS TAKFIR 
THAN AL QAEDA IS.
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There are two debates within the jihadi world over when to declare takfir. When 
you declare another Muslim a non-Muslim, you essentially kill them. The first 
questions are, what has that person done? Is he a soldier in the enemy army? Is 
he a bureaucrat in the enemy government? Is he a shopkeeper who sells to enemy 
soldiers? Or is he just a person on the street who doesn’t join our movement? 
There are lots of different arguments among jihadis over who is actually eligible 
to be killed. That’s one set of arguments. 
The more important argument, which distinguishes ISIS from al Qaeda, is that 
al Qaeda says only somebody who really knows what they are talking about can 
make the decision that another Muslim is a non-Muslim. You need to get the 
decision from a scholar, a religious leader, somebody who has thought about this 
question really carefully. And whenever possible, you need to make that decision 
about individuals rather than broad categories of people, unless maybe they are 
enemy soldiers.
The reason why al Qaeda is doing this is to set de facto limits on the types of 
people within the Islamic community, within the ummah, whom they are going 
to kill. Al Qaeda says American civilians can be attacked because the United 
States is a democracy and the people support their government. Therefore, all 
Americans are legitimate potential victims. Within the Islamic world, al Qaeda 
is much more restrictive about whom it thinks you ought to be able to kill. ISIS is 
really interesting, because its ideology prioritizes violence and the participation 
in jihad above all else. In other words, its leaders say, “Look, you might be some 
brilliant Islamic jihadi legal scholar, but if you don’t actually go out and fight, 
then you don’t really understand Islam. You are just sitting around reading your 
books all day. But our understanding of Islam is that you have got to go and 
fight for it. If you aren’t doing that, then how good a Muslim can you be?” That 
leads to the position, “Well, as long as you are out fighting, you must be the best 
Muslim; therefore, you can decide who is not a good Muslim. You are the one 
who really understands the religion.” This boils down to ISIS saying, “We can kill 
anybody. We can declare who is a non-Muslim and go kill them.” Killing isn’t 
centrally controlled. 
So this is a real challenge in ISIS’s ideology because, on the one hand, ISIS is 
trying to build a state structure. On the other hand, it has always espoused this 
ideology that delegates authority down to individuals to make this incredibly 
far-reaching theological, ideological, and political decision of declaring another 
Muslim to be non-Muslim. The way ISIS tries to square that circle is by saying, 
“Well, that was true until we had a Caliph—until we declared that there was a 
Caliphate. Now we all listen to him.” But it had already created this ethos, this 
long lineage of ideology that devolves this kind of authority to lots of different 
people. Now ISIS’s leaders are trying to get it back in the box—and that’s going 
to be hard for them to manage. ISIS, in the long run, is going to be fractious. 
The other reason ISIS is likely to be fractious in the long run is that while al 
Qaeda has this big tent ideology but a small organization, ISIS has a more narrow 
ideology but a big organization. If you want to join ISIS, the number one thing 
you have to do is show that you are willing to go to them. If you do that, you can 
get in. You are part of the club. You see this difference reflected in the different 
ways that foreign fighters interact with some groups in Syria. For example, to 
join Jabhat al-Nusra, which is an al Qaeda affiliate, somebody has to vouch for 
ISIS IS GOING TO 
BE INHERENTLY 
FRACTIOUS. THAT IS 
ITS ACHILLES HEEL IN 
THE LONG RUN.
Iraqis inspect the damage at a bomb 
site claimed by ISIS near a market 
in the Sadr City area of northern 
Baghdad, on 28 February 2016.
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you; you have to be a known entity. It is a smaller, more exclusive, more elite 
(in some ways) organization. Whereas with ISIS, if you show up and you are 
willing to do brutal things, that is more or less your stamp of approval. It’s almost 
automatic.
This is a major difference in the ways al Qaeda and ISIS were structured. But 
I think it’s also one of the things that empowers ISIS and gives it the ability 
to recruit people remotely. It is saying not just, “You are a good Muslim,” but 
also, “You can be part of our group. And all you have to do is believe you are.” 
In contrast, al Qaeda might say, “You go do your thing over there, but you are 
not really al Qaeda. You are part of our movement, but you are not part of our 
organization.” 
I think this has something to do with the ability of ISIS to inspire people in the 
West to come and join them. And I certainly think it has something to do with 
their ability to grow so quickly. That said, that ethos, that ideology, that willing-
ness to accept all these people, means that ISIS is going to be inherently fractious. 
That is its Achilles heel in the long run. I don’t think it will be able to hold 
together, but I do think that it will be resilient and hard to destroy. 
BORER: You more or less answered my next question. I was going to ask you 
about the potential impact of ISIS outside of Syria and Iraq. It sounds like they 
are trying to consolidate power inside the Caliphate, but are they still going to 
have an echo effect in other parts of the globe, meaning effects that they may not 
be able to control?
FISHMAN: That’s the biggest change, in my opinion. There was this powerful 
continuity from 2006 until now: the Islamic State of Iraq was intended to be a 
real state in the way that we think of ISIS as a proto-state or a pseudo-state today. 
At least, it has a lot of those elements to it. But when ISIS declared itself the 
“Islamic State,” the Caliphate, and said everyone should swear allegiance to it, 
that was a difference. It was saying, “Not only are we going to govern here in Iraq 
and Syria, but we are a point of inspiration and leadership in all of these other 
places around the world.” That’s new. 
ISIS’s predecessors always had regional connections. So the group that became 
ISIS had lots of connections in Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, and Europe. But ISIS’s 
leaders purposefully avoided saying all of their supporters out there were part 
of the organization, because they wanted them to be able to operate without 
the affiliation. Not being formally affiliated with al Qaeda in Iraq or the Islamic 
State of Iraq gave those sympathizers some operational security. That has clearly 
changed. Al Qaeda had a sort of built-in advise-and-assist mission for decades, 
and it’s not totally clear to me how ISIS is managing that today. How often are 
they sending people from Iraq and Syria to Gaza? To Libya? To the Sinai? To 
Afghanistan? To bolster these affiliate provinces of ISIS? It’s a hard thing to learn 
about from open sources. 
There is a lot of circumstantial evidence that suggests this is happening in ways 
that are different from before—certainly a lot of evidence that it is happening 
digitally. ISIS is taking lessons learned and packaging them up to be used in other 
places. And that’s smart; that’s what people do. The United States does that: we 
package up learning materials to reflect on and to expand our digital reach. Well, 
YOU CAN’T USE JIHADIS 




An Iraqi security officer carries a dead 
citizen after a suicide car bombing, 
claimed by ISIS, in the Karrada 
neighborhood of Baghdad, Iraq,  
on 3 July 2016
Aftermath of suicide bomb attack in 
the Karrada neighborhood of  
Baghdad, Iraq, on 3 July 2016
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ISIS is doing the same thing, but fortunately, they don’t 
have military schools where everybody can get together. 
To the extent that they do, those are in Iraq and Syria. 
This is actually one of the fascinating differences between 
ISIS today and the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006 and 2007. 
One of the great challenges for the organization in 2006 
and 2007 was that most of the foreign fighters who came 
in had no training whatsoever. They really didn’t know 
what they were doing, and they were actually a security 
problem for the Islamic State of Iraq. They would show 
up, they would speak Arabic with a conspicuous accent, 
they wouldn’t have any knowledge about Iraq, they 
wouldn’t be able to shoot straight—in short, they 
wouldn’t have even basic skills. 
BORER: They were foreign tourists?
FISHMAN: Yes, they were tourists. You can turn a tourist. 
You can use a tourist as a suicide bomber. But some of 
these foreigners didn’t want to be suicide bombers, so 
the Islamic State of Iraq needed to find a way to train 
those people and needed to find the space to train them 
in. That was also a problem. There was a lot of talk for a 
time about what a “safe haven” meant for the group. A 
safe haven means you can take tourists and turn them into 
soldiers. Al Qaeda in Iraq had such a place for a while in 
2005–2006, and then it lost it for a long time. Now ISIS 
has one again, and it is still getting a bunch of tourists. 
This time, though, it also has the ability to train tourists 
and make them into soldiers. That’s terrifying. 
BORER: I am going to wrap up the interview with the 
“king for a day” question. If you were the king of the 
world, what one significant change would you make that 
you think would reorient this situation?
FISHMAN: I would try to get back to a consensus among 
countries—a consensus that I, maybe naively, felt was 
there at one time. Maybe this consensus never really 
existed, but in 2005 and 2006, especially after al Qaeda’s 
attacks on Saudi Arabia from 2003 to 2005, I thought that 
there was a real sense of consensus in the international 
community that you can’t use jihadis as tools of state 
foreign policy. Lo and behold, when the Syrian civil war 
started, lots of countries essentially tried to instrumen-
talize the jihadis to go after the Assad regime. Frankly, 
the Assad regime had been trying for a long time to 
instrumentalize jihadis as well. So it was sort of a pox on 
everybody’s house. 
I thought that the lesson had been learned, but it hadn’t. 
This current situation illustrates the danger. We can see 
this today in some very dangerous Gulf state support 
for some of the jihadi groups operating in Syria. We see 
it in Turkey’s toleration of foreign fighters crossing the 
border with Syria for years. We saw it in Assad’s behavior 
for decades, first in Lebanon and then in Iraq, as well as 
within Syria. The global community of responsible people 
has to agree that there are certain kinds of behaviors and 
certain kinds of ideas that are just unacceptable, and that 
are corrosive to stability. The kinds of ideas that ISIS and 
its predecessors have been pumping out for 15 years now 
should have been alarming enough, and everybody should 
have known that these were people to be avoided at all 
costs. The fact that the Syrians didn’t know this, that the 
Iranians tolerated some of the jihadis’ behavior as well, 
and that American allies in the Gulf and Turkey did the 
same—all for their own purposes, all for understandable 
strategic objectives—was unacceptable, in my opinion. So 
we have to try to get back to a point of consensus around 
this problem. I don’t know how you do that, because now 
the choices are getting worse, with ISIS pushing the limits 
of what a jihadi group is. Some people even see groups like 
Jabhat al-Nusra as a reasonable alternative these days. And 
I think that’s crazy. We have got to turn that around. ²
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STATE OF THE ART
How to Read a (War) Comic Ryan Stuart, US Naval Postgraduate School
The phrase “war comic” feels oxymoronic, doesn’t it? 
While war poetry, war novels, and war movies are long-accepted narrative 
forms (the first ballads passed down in most oral traditions are war ep-
ics)—and despite the rampant humor some of those forms exhibit—some-
how the words “war” and “comic” just don’t seem to go together.1
There’s the more highbrow term graphic novel. It’s kind of a weasel term, 
borrowing as it does the solemn acceptance of the novel as “art,” while 
furthering the assumption that no mere comic can claim that august 
mantle. But let’s use the term anyway, at least until the canon comes up 
with a better one.
Terminal Lance: The White Donkey is a graphic novel based in part on 
one former Marine’s experience in Iraq.2 Some of you may be familiar 
with author Maximilian Uriarte’s “Terminal Lance” strip, which is 
published in the Marine Corps Times newspaper and on his own web-
site.3 The first time Uriarte went to Iraq,  in 2007–2008, he deployed 
to the Zaidon region as the turret gunner of an MRAP.4 Based on his 
own experiences during that deployment, The White Donkey follows a 
Marine named Abe and one of his buddies from early in their enlist-
ment to Abe’s dark, PTSD-induced encounter with suicide.
Moving Parts
Graphic novels generally have two aspects: the pictures and the 
words.5 Both carry the story’s plot and themes equally. For this 
article, we’ll look at the pictorial art and how it conveys the 
story’s plot, themes, and emotions. I lean heavily on Scott 
McCloud’s Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art, a fine 
work that gives an insider’s perspective on how comics and 
graphic novels function.6 
Just as each sentence in a novel is (one hopes) carefully 
crafted by the author for a specific effect, to illuminate a 
character or scene or to convey thematic meaning, so is 
each aspect of the art in a graphic novel chosen to depict the 
author/illustrator’s intent.7 The illustrator of a graphic novel 
makes deliberate choices not only about what should be de-
scribed in words and what should be shown in pictures, 
but also about the level of visual abstraction, the 
appearance of lines, how to distribute 
panels to show time or convey 
feeling, and how to use color  
(or its absence) to best effect.
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But in moments of high stress, something interesting 
happens (figure 3).
Gone are many of the distinguishing features—the shape 
of his eyes, the few lines around his mouth, the contours 
of his lips. He’s pure, abstracted expression now: he’s all 
terror. Granted he’s not two dots and a line, but still, it’s 
not much of a stretch to say that you can’t be positive he’s 
even a he, and so this face could be anybody. In your mind 
as a reader, this could be you. Abstraction opens the door; 
it allows you to feel terror.
The interesting thing about levels of abstraction is that the more detailed a 
drawing of a face is, the less likely one is to identify with that character. In figure 1, 
that handsome fellow on the left is clearly a white guy 
somewhere around age 40; as you move toward the 
right he begins to lose those distinctive features until, 
at the far right, he may not even be a he. That far-right 
face could be any person, at any age. The specific face 
has become the idea of a face. This degree of abstraction 
allows a reader to see him- or herself as the character, to 
enter into the world of the story as that character.
In The White Donkey, our protagonist Abe is introduced 
in a very detailed image (figure 2).
Underneath the helmet, he has identifiable features and 
a clearly sanguine expression, and we gather information 
about him: he’s young; has nice-enough, regular features; 
he’s got on military gear; he’s maybe a little bored. Can a reader identify with 
him? Perhaps in parts—being a young man, being in the military. But can a reader 
(psychologically) become him? Not likely. He’s still only himself, and the reader 
can’t have his specific features.
Abstraction
Let’s begin with the knottiest, but in many ways most interesting, aspect of graphic novel illustration: abstraction. Put 
simply, any object can be drawn as a photorealistic imitation or as a quick sketch of just a few marks, or as any interpreta-
tion along the spectrum between those points. Take a look at your coffee cup: it can be drawn with all the stains and 
scratches, or as a couple of lines and arcs. The viewer will recognize it in either case.
This is even more the case with human 
faces—a face can be reduced to two dots 
and a line, and you’ll still recognize it as a 
face, as in figure 1.
Figure 1. You’ll see a face in an American electrical outlet, too.
Figure 2. The specificity of Abe
Figure 3. Iconic Abe
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Figure 4. The psychology of lines
Line
You might think that lines wouldn’t have much to say, but they’re actually very 
expressive (figure 4). 
Figure 5. The ghosting donkey
And there are yet more variations on a line than shown here: drawing software 
can create thousands of different types of lines. A person drawing by hand has an 
infinitude of choices. Everything about a line carries meaning: its weight (thick-
ness), angle, hue (darkness or lightness), uniformity, and so on. In the panels 
shown in figure 5, the gradual lightening of the donkey’s lines gives the scene a 
ghost-like spectral feeling.
By this point in the graphic novel, the donkey has made a few interesting and 
unlikely appearances. It clearly carries some heavy symbolic significance for Abe 
and his companions, and for Uriarte. In figure 5, as the donkey disappears, we 
must ask what the donkey represents—is it a hallucination? A dream? A vision? 
Or a sign?
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Panels as Time
In traditional comics, a panel was literally a box—one box 
that surrounded each drawing. In newspapers, an editorial 
comic might be one drawing in one box, while a daily strip 
might have four or five same-sized boxes. Comics these days 
use panels far more flexibly and interestingly, so that now a 
panel can convey time.
In real life, time is not experienced as a sequence of fixed, 
equal parts marching in lockstep. Combat time has been 
called “long periods of boredom punctuated with sheer 
terror.” Panels chop time into discrete moments or events, 
and the shape of the panel illustrates not the duration of 
time but the feeling of it (figure 6).
In the top image, the disinterest of the mustachioed fellow, 
staccato in three panels, is clear and unchanging. It could 
have been represented in just one panel, but the duplication 
makes it extra clear that some time has passed before he 
answers his interlocutor’s question. 
In the bottom image, some uninteresting detail has been 
added (the lamp, the back of the chair), but the experience 
is of a long stretch of time between question and answer. It 
actually feels longer than the three staccato panels.
Uriarte uses panels to very good effect in The White Donkey. 
After Abe undergoes an assault of a haircut across 13 panels 
that are compressed into two pages, Uriarte gives us this 
image, which occupies the next full page (figure 7).
Abe’s resigned disgust is evident in the expanse of that 
panel, and the fact that it occupies a full page gives us plenty 
of time to absorb his feeling.
In general, Uriarte uses multiple panels to express com-
pressed time, and larger ones to express its expansion. In 
figure 8, Abe’s on his first mission in Iraq, an escort patrol. 
His job is to keep an eye out for any suspicious item in the 
road that might be an IED. Here he’s spotted a truck ahead 
that’s carrying some large and unidentified canisters, but 
his more experienced driver has told him to chill. Figure 8 
shows the art as they pass the truck. 
The alarm in his face is evident (again, note how his face 
is drawn more abstractly) and the tight space between the 
three panels gives a feeling of time being squeezed. These 
three panels are also chained by Abe’s drumbeat of curses—
reading them, one counts each curse as a second or so of 
time. Taken together, words and picture create a sense of 
time being terribly distorted, as it must feel to someone who 
fears they’re passing a monstrous bomb.
Figure 6. The feeling of time passing (McCloud)
Figure 7. The high dudgeon of an unwanted haircut
August 2016
59
Shortly after this event, 
Uriarte introduces the 
reader to the white 
donkey of the title. The 
convoy has passed the 
not-a-bomb truck but 
has not yet reached its 
destination when it 
is stopped by a white 
donkey in the road 
(figure 9).
This image is the first 
in the graphic novel to 
span two pages, and 
Uriarte has made some 
really intriguing choices 
for this art.
Figure 9. Full stop white donkey.
Figure 8. Punctuated terror
Many things about it contribute to the feeling of a full stop: the white space around the image (it doesn’t continue clear off 
the page); the border around the panel; the balance of the lead truck’s big, heavy, black wheels across the centerline of the 
image. Although the donkey is clearly walking, the two trucks appear motionless, and the blurriness of the palm trees in 
the background gives no clues about movement. It’s an odd, arrested image.8 It tells you without doubt that the donkey is 
important, very important, and you should stop and pay attention.
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One last panel relating to time is fun 
to examine. This one occurs after Abe 
has been in-country for some time 
and the newness of the experience has 
waned. Scary things have happened, 
but none were scarring, and the 
images feel settled and unconnected 
(figure 10).
Figure 10. Scrapbook
This panel also covers two pages. It is composed of a number of small scenes—
handing out water, negotiating at a checkpoint—entirely without borders. 
Across the top of the panel, trucks come “in” toward the reader; at the bottom, 
they exit the scene in rhythm like a small metronome. The images are all fairly 
matter-of-fact and some are quite heartening. But they are unbounded by time, 
by the black boxes of panels, and the feeling the collage conveys is of random 




Color is emotion. Don’t believe me? Look at figure 11. Give 
it an honest test, now: look at it for at least five seconds and 
check your inner emotional register.
Don’t you feel a little cheerier, kind of upbeat, like maybe 
tonight would be a good night to go out dancing? I don’t 
have the expertise in color theory to tell you why, but for 
most Westerners, these are energetic, happy colors.10
Ok, now have a look at this (figure 12).
Figure 11. Take your time looking.
Figure 12. Possibly nap-inducing colors
Figure 13. Not a good day for a happy pink
If you’re like most Westerners, you’ll be feeling rather less chipper 
now, maybe a bit relaxed, even serene. Color has a very direct 
effect on how we feel.
Uriarte uses a lot of what are called duotones in his work. The 
images are made of black and one other color (see figures 7–10 for 
examples). Sometimes the color is pale, sometimes deep, but it is 
still only one color plus black, which can also become some hue of 
gray. That’s a duotone.
Generally speaking, Uriarte has a color scheme for each location in the novel: a sea-green for the training base in 
Kaneohe, Hawaii, sepia for Camp Wilson, California, purple for some half-waking states, khaki for Iraq, and so on. 
These shifts make for a nice visual hint: the reader absorbs the idea that if the color has changed, so has the place—
external or internal. The color is not always bounded by line (remember learning to color within the lines?), but is 
generally a wash of watercolor that shifts subtly in hue and density, giving the work a range of texture. It’s a nice choice 
that allows for a lot of variation in the art.11
Having set up these rules for himself, Uriarte breaks them in some interesting ways. In one panel, otherwise colored in Iraq 
khaki, the red and green of the Iraqi flag practically jump off the page. For reasons I can’t guess, the goggles the Marines 
wear are often some color between tan and a dusty rose. In figure 13, Abe is handed a Gatorade after a particularly horrible 
day, and the drink’s cheerful pink is jarring.
One of the worst 
events in the book is 
covered in red. The 
scarcity of other 
colors throughout 
makes that red 
feel shocking and 
terrible. Finally, the 
most awful night-
mare in the book 
is all in stark black, 
white, and red, and 
is unforgettable.
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Words & Pictures
So there you are at your drafting table, working up the next scene in your graphic 
novel, and you have yet another choice: do you write it in words, or draw 
it in pictures, or both? If both, do the words express the same thing as the 
picture? The opposite of the picture? Something entirely tangential to the 
picture, like a character’s thoughts in a bubble? Do the words amplify some 
non-pictorial aspect of the scene?
There are a lot of choices to be made.
Uriarte tends generally to stick to pretty conventional choices: the words and 
images in The White Donkey are closely tied, one generally supporting the other. 
There are usually a lot more words on the page when Abe’s at home on leave, so 
we can assume civilian life is a lot chattier. Until the end of the book, that is.
Abe is deep into depression and suffering from PTSD by the last 40 or so pages 
of the book, most of which are set in Oregon where Abe is home on leave. 
It’s very evident that language is deserting him. He speaks very little—whole 
two-page spreads can go by in which he stays silent, and all the talking is done 
by others in his life. There’s one remarkable series of 20 pages (an eternity 
in a graphic novel) where he speaks not one word and is not even capable of 
language. Uriarte is trying to convey, I think, the terrible difficulty of putting 
the experience of the Iraq war into words. Or perhaps the fact must be faced: 
there are some experiences that cannot be conveyed in words, however expert the 
writer.
Why a Graphic Novel?
Uriarte says that he began writing this story as a conventional novel, which didn’t 
work. He then wrote it as a screenplay, ending up with a 145-page version. (That 
would make it a two-and-a-half-hour movie.) Because Uriarte earned a degree in 
animation, storyboarding the screenplay must have seemed a natural fit.12
Given the other art forms that are available, however, we have to ask: why make 
a graphic novel? A text-based novel would surely find a wider audience than a 
graphic novel. A movie could make more money. Assuming that either of those 
things could be made without creative interference, what advantage does the 
graphic novel hold for a storyteller?
A text-only version of Abe’s story would lack the immediacy that the graphic 
novel inherently offers. However fluent we are, reading text is still an effort of 
translation: the reader must transform the squiggles of type into mental images, 
sounds, smells, and so on. A graphic novel does all this mental heavy lifting for 
us by drawing the pictures, giving sound a shape (the jagged shape of the line 
container around a BOOM, for example), and depicting smell with stink lines or 
an expression of disgust on a character’s face. It’s a much less mediated, much 
more direct experience.
Why not make a movie, then? A movie hands the watcher all the pictures and 
sound a person could hope for, sometimes to the point of sensory overload. 
But one thing is lacking in film:  identification. To a limited extent, people do 
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identify with a movie character when the character shares some trait with the 
watcher or expresses some familiar emotion. Still, I think the experience is much 
more constrained. We can never become that guy on the screen because he’s 
seven feet tall, absolutely specific in his gestures and voice, and probably much 
better looking than we are. In a comic book, the generally iconic style of repre-
sentation allows a reader to inhabit the character, not merely to observe.
All in all, I found that Terminal Lance: The White Donkey allowed me to feel 
what it is like to be a shiny new Marine in a combat zone—and all the deadly 
consequences thereof—in a way no other medium could do. Reading it is an 
experience not to be missed. ²
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NOTES
1  Let’s agree to ignore the propaganda comics skulking in that dark corner over there.
2  Maximilian Uriarte, Terminal Lance: The White Donkey (New York: Little, Brown & Co.), 
2016.
3  See http://www.terminallance.com
4 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected armored vehicle.
5  Some graphic novels don’t have words at all except the onomatopoeic ones, like “BOOM!”
6 Scott McCloud, Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art (New York: William Morrow 
Paperbacks, 1994).
7 Let’s dispense quickly with the fantasy, shall we? No art form—pictorial, musical, kinetic, 
written, or whatever—is a serendipitous outpouring of Muse magic. All serious artists study 
and practice their craft for years, as thoroughly as any scientist, soldier, and—it is fervently to 
be hoped—dentist does. Inspiration isn’t the same as fairy dust.
8  The donkey gets some very interesting visual treatments throughout the work, as do a coyote 
or two and a fox. 
9  Other, later panels have quite the opposite visual effect. I hope readers of this article will be 
intrigued enough to read The White Donkey, so I’m not going to spoil it by examining those 
more shocking panels. You’ll know ‘em when you see ‘em. 
10 If you’re curious, you can read more here: http://www.colormatters.com/ . Culture matters 
with regard to color. For example, in Western cultures black is associated with death; in Asian 
cultures, death is white. All my commentary here relates to Western cultures. As a side note, I 
once saw two Pantone books (those are printers’ books of color swatches, a little like the color 
strips you see in a paint store) side by side: one made for the United States and one for Japan. 
The two books were easily distinguishable: the very range of color and hue was different. This 
leads me to wonder whether people from different parts of the world actually perceive color 
differently, and react to something more than cultural cues.
11 Comics traditionally have used only black and white or duotones to reduce printing costs. 
I can’t say whether Uriarte chose duotones for this reason, or possibly as a nod to comic art 
history, or for another reason altogether. It works for his story, however.
12 Learn more about storyboarding here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Storyboard . It’s an 
amazingly useful technique for much more than creating graphic novels.
Global Responses to Maritime Violence
Edited by Paul Shemella 
Stanford University Press, April 2016 
344 pages 
$27.95 
Global Responses to Maritime Violence is a full discussion of maritime security 
short of war. The chapters in this volume examine maritime terrorism, piracy, 
maritime smuggling, and everything in between. The perpetrators of these activi-
ties derive benefit from violence and disorder in the maritime domain; the chal-
lenge for governments is to impose order while protecting citizens who live by 
and depend on the sea. Maritime violence constitutes an “ecosystem” in which 
connections and common threads offer clues to effective government actions. 
The book coheres around the premise that good maritime governance, though 
difficult, is worth the considerable resources required. It concludes by offering 








2016 Special Operations Essays
Each year, the Joint Special Operations University partners with the Special 
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Chapter of the National Defense In-
dustrial Association in sponsoring an annual essay contest. This year’s first place 
winner is US Air Force Major Jared Harris, with “Daydreams of an Operational 
Planner: Reimagining the Counterterrorism Task Force.” In second place is 
US Army Major Tim Ball, with “Bringing the Alliance Back to SOF: The Role 
of NATO Special Operations Headquarters in Countering Russian Hybrid 
Warfare.” This collection also includes high-quality, original works from four 
other professional military education (PME) students: US Army Chief War-
rant Officer 3 James Allbright, Peruvian Army Colonel Ricardo Benavides, US 
Army Major Orlando Craig, and US Army Chief Warrant Officer 4 Stephen 
Dayspring. These essays provide current insights on what our PME students see 
as priority national and international security issues affecting special operations. 
They add value to the individuals’ professional development, provide an outlet 
for expressing new ideas and points of view, and contribute to the knowledge of 
the special operations community. 
These recent JSOU Press publications are available electronically in the JSOU Library Management System: 
https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications
Unconventional Economics: Operational Economics in 
Unconventional Warfare  
by Major Riley J. Post and Colonel (Ret.) Jeffrey D. Peterson, Ph.D.
In this monograph, Major Riley Post and Dr. Jeffrey Peterson offer a compelling 
look into economic activities and influence in the context of unconventional 
warfare (UW). The value of this monograph lies in the creation of a framework 
that provides a structured approach for UW practitioners to employ as they 
assess and analyze economic factors that influence and support insurgency 
movements. This framework offers a way to simplify the varied and complex 
economic activities required to support equally complex resistance operations. 
The monograph provides examples of tactical economic opportunities that 
support operational and strategic objectives. To illustrate the use of their model, 
the authors evaluate the rise and potential vulnerabilities of the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant. The authors conclude with recommendations to enhance 
training for Special Operations Forces leaders and operators in the application 
of economic factors in UW. 
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A Comprehensive and Proactive Approach to  
Unconventional Warfare  
by Will Irwin
In this paper, Mr. Irwin explores gray zone unconventional warfare (UW)  
options in the context of the recent Syria train-and-equip mission. To better 
posture itself for engagement in gray zone political warfare, the US government, 
and especially special operations forces, must work to reestablish, revitalize, 
and master important but seemingly lost components of our UW capability, as 
well as engage in concept development marked by uncommonly creative and 
innovative thinking. Mr. Irwin argues that early US UW engagement, effective 
influence and coercion actions, and a more disciplined approach to non-violent 
civil resistance in Syria could have resulted in more favorable outcomes in line 
with US interests.
Función de las SOF en la lucha contra el crimen 
organizado transnacional 
edited by William Mendel and Dr. Peter McCabe
Announced in the previous issue of CTX, now available in Spanish! This is the 
translated version of “The SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized 
Crime.” 
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